Why the Chinese Communist Party Always Wants to Turn Overseas Chinese into 'Manageable Populations': From Xinjiang Families to Control over Foreign Political Systems
The Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) overseas actions have presented a common logic: while the borders of the People's Republic of China may end, the CCP's desire to control individuals, communities, and political influence has not stopped at the borders.
A modern nation-state has legally defined jurisdiction over its citizens, but this power should be limited by national borders and legal boundaries.
The problem with the CCP is that it is increasingly unwilling to accept these boundaries.
A recent investigation by Human Rights Watch has shown that some Australian Uyghurs were interrogated and asked to provide information about the Australian Uyghur community, activists, and language schools when they returned to Xinjiang to visit their relatives.
This incident reveals a governing technique that has become increasingly important in the Xi Jinping era: converting human resources within China into overseas control capabilities.
In theory, the Beijing government has no right to ask an Australian citizen to collect political information for the Chinese government in Sydney. However, if their parents still live in Xinjiang, the situation is completely different. The Chinese security apparatus does not need to control the Australian citizen themselves, but only needs to let them know that refusing to cooperate may affect their family.
The most evil part of this power structure is that it turns kinship into a political tool.

Uyghurs are not the only targets. Over the years, overseas Hong Kongers, Tibetans, Falun Gong practitioners, Chinese dissidents, and other critics of Beijing have reported various forms of transnational harassment and pressure. Freedom House has described China as one of the countries with the widest and most complex range of transnational repression; Human Rights Watch has also recorded the Xi Jinping government's extension of domestic repression overseas.
Beijing often accuses foreign governments of interfering in China's internal affairs, but what is truly worth observing is how the CCP itself understands 'internal affairs'.

If a Uyghur who has become a foreign citizen participates in Australian political activities, Beijing still considers it related to themselves; if Taiwanese people decide their future in their own democratic system, Beijing considers it a Chinese affair; if Hong Kongers hold protests in the UK, the Chinese diplomatic system still tries to exert pressure; Beijing also demands that foreign companies modify their labeling of Taiwan according to its own political language.
This is an expanding political jurisdiction.
In Xi Jinping's political logic, the CCP not only rules over the population within the People's Republic of China but also tries to reserve some influence over overseas groups with Chinese blood, ethnic connections, family relationships, or political interest associations.
The challenge that democratic countries truly face is not simply 'Chinese influence' but a conflict between two political boundary views.
Democratic systems believe that a person can criticize any government after immigrating to Australia; the Xi Jinping regime, however, may think that as long as his parents are still in Xinjiang, he still has a political weakness that can be exploited.
To counter this transnational repression, it is not enough to rely on diplomatic statements. Democratic countries must allow victims to safely report incidents, enable the police to investigate agents and threatening behaviors, reduce the leverage of Beijing's hostages through family reunification, and clearly tell the CCP that the political freedom enjoyed by foreign citizens in democratic countries does not fall within the scope of Beijing's so-called 'core interests'.
National borders not only divide territories but also should tell the Xi Jinping regime one basic thing: the CCP's ruling power stops here.


文章讨论
已验证会员可围绕报道公开交流,并自行管理自己的内容。
正在检查会员登录状态…