From prison to society and overseas: Hong Kong’s national security system is creating an “unlimited political punishment”

Political punishment in Hong Kong is undergoing a vigilant shift: the sentences sentenced by the courts may end, but the political status conferred on a person by the national security system may not have a definite end.

The Australian SBS investigation released on August 23 provided an observation window. Hong Kong youth Chen Chison was arrested at the age of 21 for involvement in a student organization. The organization sent sweets, laundry supplies and other supplies to people imprisoned after the 2019 protests, alleging that the activities were used to build support networks among prisoners and incite anti-government sentiment. Chen Chen was arrested in September 2021 and then convicted for subversion of related crimes and served almost two years in jail. SBS reports confirmed that he was released two years later because of criminal records still unable to pursue a teacher or nurse career as originally planned.

If this is understood only as the difficulty of employing a former prisoner, it will miss out on a truly important political structure.

Focus on China: Punishment is turning from “term imprisonment” to “unlimited identity punishment”

Traditional criminal justice, at least in principle, has a boundary: the court determines the crime, sentences the punishment, and re-enteres the society after serving the sentence.

When criminal records of a political nature further shut down career channels such as teaching, nursing, etc., the actual punishment does not end as the prison doors open. A person has legally completed the sentence period, but the state continues to influence his life opportunities through career access, political records and social labels.

This means that the national security system is not only a judicial punishment, but a long-term consolidation of political identity.

Chen described to SBS that leaving the prison is like entering a “larger cage.”This phrase is important not because it is emotionally contagious, but because it accurately points to a system change in Hong Kong’s national security governance: really playing a deterrent, not necessarily just years of imprisonment, but to let the whole society know that once defined by the state as a “dangerous national security” political actor, his education, career and future may continue to be affected.

This is precisely a more effective form of governance in authoritarian politics than mere capture.

The government doesn’t need to arrest every opponent, it just needs to let enough people see the long-term cost of opposing political power.

The National Security Law changes not only what acts are illegal, but who has the right to define the “enemy.”

Beijing and the government of Hong Kong have always emphasized that the Hong Kong National Security Act aims to restore the social order after the political turmoil of 2019, and lawmakers do not need to worry.

But Focus on China believes that measuring a national security law does not depend only on whether the streets are quiet, but more on what new powers the government has acquired and what constraints such powers have.

The key change following the implementation of the Hong Kong National Security Law is that "national security" has become the top framework for redefining political activity.

Organizing unofficial primary elections can be treated as subversive cases; establishing political organizations overseas can be pursued by Hong Kong police; providing support to political persons in prison, as well as entering the investigation and conviction system of national security cases.

Therefore, the question is no longer the simple "Hong Kong has a national security law."

The real question is, when the ruling power itself becomes an interpreter of national security, who sets the line between opposing government policies, challenging the political system, and endangering the country?

In the absence of genuine political competition and effective balance of power, “national security” is easily transformed from a legal tool for protecting society to a political tool for protecting existing power structures.

From Chen Chen to Liu Kaiwon: The same set of logic of power is crossing Hong Kong’s borders

Chen Chison’s experience suggests that the national security punishment can cross the prison boundaries, while another respondent, Liu Kahwon,’s case suggests that it can also cross the geographical boundaries of Hong Kong.

Liu Caimun, a former member of the Hong Kong Regional Parliament, now resides in the UK. Hong Kong police announced in December 2024 that she was listed as the target of the national security case. Public documents from the Hong Kong government confirm that police had issued an arrest warrant for six overseas persons, including Liu Caimun, on charges of incitement to secession, subversion and conspiracy against foreign or foreign forces.

SBS reports that Liu said he had been pursued in London, needed to change routes frequently, and suffered email intrusion attempts; his relatives who were still in Hong Kong had also been questioned by National Security officials. Following and hacking behavior currently has no public judicial evidence confirming the subject of responsibility, so it can not be directly identified by the Hong Kong or Chinese government.

The Hong Kong police’s position on the overseas pursuit is unambiguous.

In July 2025, the Hong Kong police again searched for 19 overseas persons involved in the so-called "Hong Kong Parliament" and explicitly cited Article 38 of the Hong Kong National Security Act, stating that even if the act occurred outside Hong Kong, and the perpetrator is not a permanent resident of Hong Kong, as long as the relevant act is determined to be against the Hong Kong Special District, the National Security Law can still apply.

This is not the speculation of the outside world about Hong Kong law, but the law enforcement principles publicly proclaimed by the Hong Kong government itself.

Focus on China: The real danger is that “jurisdiction” and “sphere of fear” will be expanded simultaneously

The Hong Kong police, of course, cannot execute the arrest warrant on their own in the British streets.

However, this does not mean that these search orders do not have a realistic effect.

They can produce at least four levels of effect.

First, restrict the international travel of the parties.Once entering jurisdictions where law enforcement or deportation may cooperate with Beijing, the parties must assess the risk of being detained.

Secondly, those who remain in contact with the parties raise legal risk concerns.The Hong Kong police have previously publicly warned that they should not provide funding or other assistance to persons sought by the national security.

Thirdly, the pressure is spread to families who still live in Hong Kong or mainland China.

Fourth, and most importantly, let overseas political activists, even in a democratic country, continue to think about the next possible action Beijing could take.

This is the most effective side of transnational repression.

It doesn’t necessarily require Chinese police to really catch people across borders.As long as the target person changes the way he speaks, reduces political activity, cuts off contacts with family members or restricts their own travel routes, political repression has actually crossed borders.

The chain of responsibility of Hong Kong's national security system must continue to rise.

If these incidents were simply written as “Hong Kong police repressing dissidents,” the analysis would remain incomplete.

The Hong Kong national security system is not an ordinary local police department that develops itself.

In 2020, the Hong Kong National Security Law was directly formulated and implemented by Beijing in Hong Kong, after which the Hong Kong Police Force established the National Security Office; the Hong Kong National Security Agency also entered the Hong Kong national security governance framework.The Hong Kong Police's own public data showed that the police management clearly incorporated national sovereignty, security and "development interests" into the priority objectives of police work, and demanded that police work be linked to the overall policy direction of the country.

Consequently, the investigation responsibility cannot be confined only to a police officer or to a court case.

The question that needs to be continued is: who sets the standards of political security? who decides which overseas political organizations constitute a “subversion”? who approves law enforcement measures against overseas persons? how are decision-making and enforcement responsibilities allocated between the Hong Kong security system, the National Security Police, the legal department, the Chief Executive of the National Security Committee and the Beijing Central National Security System?

This is the responsibility archive that Focus on China needs to continue to establish in the future.

Because without the chain of power, reporting is ultimately just a victim’s story; it is only when the victim’s encounters are linked to the institutions, laws, officials, and command systems that determine those encounters that the news can become accountable.

What does “stability” mean?

The Hong Kong government has repeatedly referred to the situation after the implementation of the National Security Law as "by turmoil to rule".

Massive street protests disappeared, major democratic organizations collapsed, several independent media closed, a large number of activists imprisoned or left the port, and the public activity space for political opposition forces narrowed dramatically.

But that just exposes the other side of the word “stability.”

If stability in a society needs to be at the expense of opposition withdrawal from parliament, media shutdowns, politicians imprisoned, overseas dissidents hunted for rewards, and ordinary participants bearing political records for a lifetime, then stability is first and foremost a form of stability of power, and does not necessarily mean civil rights are guaranteed.

Chen’s experience should not be written as a young man’s life story.

It is more like a system model.

Prison isolates a political actor for two years; criminal records continue to affect his career; and the national security system extends the same political logic to those who have left Hong Kong through overseas searches.

From prisons to employment, from Hong Kong to London, it’s seemingly different events, but behind the same mechanisms: the Chinese-dominated national security system is constantly expanding the space where political loyalty can be censored and punished.

This is where the news really deserves to be.

The examination of the Hong Kong national security system should not just ask whether it will restore silence to the streets, but should ask a more fundamental question:

How far can a government, in the name of "national security", extend the punishment of a political dissident?

If the answer can extend from the courts to the profession, from the person to the relatives, and then from Hong Kong to overseas, then the boundaries that are being examined are not just a case of national security, but the whole system of power is forming.