20 March 2025, in Taipei Central Oil Building, A document written on < > > >. < > > > > > > > > >, Chief Executive Officer of Taiwan Oil and Frank Richards, General Director of the Alaska Natural Gas Development Corporation, Alaska The presence of Dunleavy and the presence of Guo Ji-hui, the Minister of Economy of Taiwan. This genuine contract was one and a half years before the new announcement in Trump in October

  1. The photo records the starting point of Taiwan's intention to build a long-term gas source from the north of the United States.

The Governor's trip to Taiwan triggered direct intervention in Beijing. American Alaska Public Media Disclosure April 2025, Dunleavy wrote to his office on the day of his arrival in Taipei on the day the Chinese Consul in San Francisco, Bayan-Sahwan, stating that the governor went to the so-called "Taiwan province" in China and requested to work with the governor's staff. Long talk. A subsequent official communication criticized the visit as sending the wrong signal to the “Taiwan separatist forces” and demanding that it be avoided. This is not an abstract “Taiwan tension”: the Chinese Communist Party diplomatic presence abroad is directly trying to influence the business itinerary of the Governor of a state in the United States.

In another public photograph of the presidential palace, the Alaskan delegation stood alongside Taiwan officials such as Le Chind. The Governor met with the station and several government officials, in addition to the oil. The protest by the Communist Party is aimed at this normal government and business engagement. Dunleavy was interviewed at the time and said he wanted to do business with Taiwan; The Chinese embassy and consulate opposed the Governor’s contact with Taiwan officials. This demonstrates how Xi Jinping’s regime has incorporated Taiwan’s energy trade into its political sovereignty dispute and has tried to get a third-party government to change its activities for its policy.

2025年3月阿拉斯加州长Mike Dunleavy访问台湾,与赖清德及台湾政府人员合影。图源:台湾总统府,经Alaska Public Media刊载|来源:台湾总统府/Alaska Public Media
2025年3月阿拉斯加州长Mike Dunleavy访问台湾,与赖清德及台湾政府人员合影。图源:台湾总统府,经Alaska Public Media刊载|来源:台湾总统府/Alaska Public Media · 查看图片来源 ↗

October 14th, >: China's oil is about to purchase 6 million tons of liquefied natural gas from Alaska each year and consider up to $4.4 billion (c) Target investments. The Ministry of Economy has specified that consultations continue after the letter of intent of 20 March 2025, and that the specific holding, contract and investment terms are subject to negotiation and enterprise procedures. Trump announced that Taiwan would purchase about 30% of the project production over a long period of 20 years; According to figures from both sides, 6 million tons correspond to 30 per cent of the project ' s planned annual production of about 20 million tons, but this does not mean that new production facilities are already supplying.

From the northern slope of Alaska to the southern port of Nikiski, the proposed gas pipeline is approximately 807 miles long. and to date is still facing financing and construction challenges. Another photo of the existing facilities in Nikiski, which was made public in the report, shows that there is a gas industry base in the area, but that the old facilities cannot be counted as having been built on. The Ministry of Economy of Taiwan pointed the fastest gas supply time at 2032 on 14 October, meaning that it must still rely on existing import sources and gas-receiving capacity in the coming years.

2025年阿拉斯加Nikiski已有LNG终端资料照片,项目拟议管线尚需建设。图源:KDLL Alaska Public Radio
2025年阿拉斯加Nikiski已有LNG终端资料照片,项目拟议管线尚需建设。图源:KDLL Alaska Public Radio · 查看图片来源 ↗

The white tank and sea dyke of the gas station Ko Hung Yong-an are part of Taiwan ' s current energy system. Taiwan wants to obtain new natural gas from Alaska, not as a regular long-term purchase far from politics. Taiwan ' s electricity, industry and domestic gas depend on seaborne imports, and excessive concentration of gas sources increases the risk of routes. The Alaska project envisages a straight Pacific route to Taiwan, avoiding the Panama Canal; One more source would provide an additional supply route that could be chosen on its own.

台湾高雄永安天然气接收站既有设施航拍资料图,用于呈现台湾实际进口能源设施;图源:梅花新闻|来源:梅花新聞網/高雄永安LNG接收站航拍
台湾高雄永安天然气接收站既有设施航拍资料图,用于呈现台湾实际进口能源设施;图源:梅花新闻|来源:梅花新聞網/高雄永安LNG接收站航拍 · 查看图片来源 ↗

The Xi regime has continued to expand its military activities in the Taiwan Straits, sea and air, in an attempt to bring Taiwan ' s foreign economic, trade and political contacts into Beijing control. The pressure on the US Governor to visit is just as demonstrated by a diplomatic letter: the Chinese Communist Party (CPD) Government makes political judgements, diplomatic missions abroad conveys pressure to the US local government, and the pressure is being exerted on Taiwan ' s commercial negotiations for a long-term energy supply. It is not an abstract diplomatic courtesy that is affected here, but rather the normal autonomy of Taiwan ' s enterprises to participate in international energy projects.

When the letter of intent was signed in 2025, Taiwan oil faced the long-term supply and investment options; The 6 million tons of annual purchases and $4.4 billion in investment were announced in October 2026, still facing financing, plant-building, transport and future energy prices. Between the two public nodes, the Governor of Alaska ' s visit to the station and the diplomatic protest by the Communist Party have left documents and photographs. Taiwan had to create a new source of energy, while Beijing had tried to interfere with who could come to Taiwan to negotiate the business.

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