Registration within 14 days, information open to the public: How Canadian new law allows secret foreign agency relations to leave names

Canada has officially enforced the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act on August 4.For those who have long been concerned about the Chinese Communist Party’s war, overseas political influence and foreign intervention, this law is not the most important place to add a new intelligence crime, but to change the law enforcement entrance when facing “grey influence activities.”

Under the system announced by the Canadian government, the first thing that needs to be checked is the “arrangement relationship.”

A person in Canada who supports Beijing policy, criticizes the Taiwan government, or even publicly praises the Communist Party of China does not in itself trigger registration obligations because of political views. The new system concerns whether the person or institution has arrangements with “foreign entities” and engages in activities that affect Canadian politics or government procedures under this relationship.

The second is the object of activity.

The law does not require that all business and social contacts related to the Chinese government be fully registered, but focuses on acts that affect public officials, political processes and government decisions. For example, foreign actors can communicate their positions to Canadian government officials or influence Canadian political decisions through public communication activities.

The third is time.

The rules published by the Office of the Canadian Commissioner for Foreign Affairs require that new qualifying arrangements should be registered within 14 days in principle. For arrangements already existing before the law came into force on August 4, a transitional period is set, and the declaration can be completed by October 3.

The fourth, and one of the real political implications of this system, is publicity.

The registration system is not only an internal database that intelligence agencies can access. The Canadian government explicitly states that the public can inquire who is jointly engaged in influence activities with foreign entities, as well as the nature of the related activities. A person who could previously act as a “community person”, “business representative” and “independent adviser” once registered, the foreign trust relationship behind it will be viewed by the media, parliament and the public.

The fifth is law enforcement.

Foreign Influence Commissioners have the responsibility of overseeing compliance, and the law also lays down administrative fines, investigations and criminal liability in serious cases.In other words, registration does not mean that activity is illegal; the real legal risk is that you have the obligation to register, but continue to hide the foreign trust relationship.

This design hits precisely the most difficult legal areas of foreign influence activity.

Traditional espionage typically requires the state to prove that the defendant has stolen secrets, secretly represented a foreign government, or carried out other clear criminal acts. But modern influence activities often do not need to steal any documents. Foreign governments can fully contact politicians who have local identity through immigrants, business people, public relations companies, community organizations, and even package their political claims into “civil opinions.”

That’s why Canada’s controversy over China’s foreign intervention has long focused on a system of unification and agency, not just traditional espionage.

The new legal idea is not to require prosecutors to first prove that someone is a “Chinese spy,” but to raise a more basic question: Who do you represent when influencing the Canadian government?

This problem may seem simple, but it can have a very large transparency effect.

If an organization is completely independent, it can continue to publicly express its position; if it actually accepts foreign government arrangements, it is necessary to disclose this relationship according to law. The boundary between legitimate lobbying and secret foreign agents is therefore no longer entirely dependent on the secret judgment of intelligence agencies, but begins to form public legal records.

For the overseas unified war system of the Communist Party of China, this change is more difficult than banning several organizations.

The effectiveness of the war influences often rely on vague identities: the will of the state appears through the "civil voice", government relations are packaged into community relations, and political tasks are described as ordinary exchanges.

Canada has not banned the Chinese government from expressing its views.

It has begun asking Beijing not to hide behind others to express its views.

This is the core legal meaning of the new system that was officially operating on August 4.