The 168 men of Hongfu are buried in the fire.

A fire that claimed 168 lives burned down seven residential buildings in Hong Kong, Tai Po Hongfeng, and burned down the administrative system that the Hong Kong Government had long claimed to be able to guarantee public safety.

On 29 October 2026, Hong Kong Chief Executive Li Jiaqia led seven senior officials who bowed collectively at a press conference at the Government headquarters to formally apologize for the Hongfukuya Level 5 fire that occurred on 26 November

1. Meanwhile, the Director of the Housing Authority, Ho Yonghyun, resigned and a report of an independent investigation of over 1,000 pages was officially made public.

However, the investigation report revealed more problems than the resignation of a director.

The security risks of building maintenance work have been constantly reflected by the residents more than a year before the fire; (b) The contractor is suspected of using materials that do not meet fire-proof standards; (b) The insufficiency of some of the supervisory staff; There was a serious failure of the construction consultants and the construction enterprise. The four government departments that were responsible for overseeing security have not really prevented the risk from building up.

168 deaths, which were eventually confirmed by a government-appointed independent investigation report, are closely linked to long-standing regulatory gaps and failures in the management of works.

From the tender for construction, the purchase of materials to the fire inspection, from the complaint of the residents to the supervision of the Government, the Hongfuh fire was not a single error worth pursuing. The disaster revealed the deep-seated problems of the Hong Kong public works regulatory system.

♪ The residents have warned long ago, and the regulatory bodies have kept the danger alive ♪

Hong Fu-Cheng is located in Hong Kong's new world, and eight residential buildings were built in the 1980s. At the time of the fire, large-scale outside wall maintenance work was under way in several of the buildings.

The outer walls of the building were surrounded by bamboo plaques and green protection nets, and some windows were covered by materials such as bubble sheeting. These facilities, which were intended to serve the construction work, eventually became an important condition for the rapid spread of the fire.

On the afternoon of 26 November 2025, the fire first occurred near the outer wall of one of the residential buildings, and then spread rapidly along the shed and the outer wall, eventually affecting seven high-level buildings.

The smoke and fire spread upwards along the building, leaving a large number of inhabitants trapped in their rooms. Firefighters faced a massive fire that spanned several thirty-first floors of residential buildings.

A total of 168 people were killed, including a fireman who died in the line of duty. The Government confirmed that the disaster affected 1,984 families.

After 30 hearings, 80 factual and expert witnesses ' testimonies and over a million files and materials, the Commission of Inquiry concluded that the source of the fire was likely to be a source of fire, such as cigarettes, that had not been fully extinguished. But what really turns fire into a mass death is the combination of many risk factors in building maintenance.

The investigation indicated that the project involved persons who had been suspected of impersonating non-retarded shantytown networks as styling the required treasury networks; Flammable hair-jelling materials were used near windows; Some of the escape and fire-fighting facilities were affected by the construction.

These problems are not entirely undetectable.

Before the fire, the residents of Hong Fu-Cheng had complained on several occasions about the security risks of construction. Concerns were expressed about the risk of fire over the outside wall material and dissatisfaction was expressed with the supervision of the works and the construction arrangements.

The dangers that the population can see, why are they not effectively identified and corrected by the regulatory authorities with the expertise, enforcement powers and inspection resources?

The independent commission ' s investigation gave an alarming finding:

Without a real and effective integration of fire safety concerns in the government sector, complaints from the population about fire hazards are left in regulatory gaps.

This means that before the fire, the Government had the opportunity to detect risks, but failed to use the administrative power available to protect the population.

Four government departments are failing and the resignation of a director is difficult to end

The findings of the investigation, published on 29 October, point to four institutions for lack of oversight:

• Independent review team under the Housing Authority.
• House Department.
• Fire department.
• Labour Department.

These institutions have separate responsibilities for building supervision, engineering safety, fire safety supervision and occupational safety.

The fact that the Hongfu-Chu maintenance works were able to continue indicates that the relevant regulatory chain has not been effectively constrained for a long time.

The most noteworthy is the Independent Review Group of the Housing Authority.

On 28 November 2025, two days after the fire, the Hong Kong Government publicly stated that the contractor had previously submitted a shanty-net test report to the independent review team, which had revealed no failure to meet fire-prevention requirements. The Government also mentioned that the team had visited the site to inspect samples and the combustion tests, and that no problems of flammable assistance had been identified.

However, an independent investigation one year later revealed serious problems such as the posing of non-retarded shantytown networks as flame retardants and inadequate government oversight.

There is an incongruous contradiction between what the official authorities claimed to have examined and found no problems and the fact that the independent investigation eventually revealed.

When materials that do not meet safety standards are capable of being inspected through multiple stages of engineering procurement, site management and supervision, the question goes beyond the seriousness of the individual staff member ' s duties.

According to the survey, some professionals and contractors are suspected of having abandoned their professional responsibilities and even of having used professional qualifications to cover improper engineering activities. The inspection procedures were notified in advance, materials and construction were not properly reflected, which rendered the arrangements that should have been made to independently supervise the work ineffective.

At the press conference, Jia Chau announced that the Director General of the Housing Authority, Ho Yonghyun, had resigned on 28 October and had ceased to be the Director General on 29 October.

He also stressed that Ho Yonghyun had not been found to have made a personal error, but that political responsibility remained due to the relevant supervisory responsibilities of the Housing Authority.

This statement recognizes an important principle of government accountability: even if the official in charge does not personally commit the offence, he or she will be held responsible for the major management failures of the department under his or her command.

However, the fact that the fire in Hongfu involved four government departments and the resignation of a director of the Housing Authority was clearly insufficient to cover all possible regulatory failures.

The Government announced that it would conduct further investigations into some 40 to 50 persons concerned and plans to clarify administrative responsibilities within three months.

This arrangement is a clear indication that the political accountability announced on 29 October did not complete the investigation of the entire chain of responsibility of the Government.

# Maintenance works are in the business of interest, and residents bear the fatal consequences

Another important finding of the Independent Commission concerned the persistent problem of the siege, fraud and corruption in the Hong Kong construction and maintenance market.

The term " condensed " means that multiple tender participants actually subject a particular interest group to competitive bidding for the work by colluding with the offer or the winning result.

The survey indicated that some construction maintenance projects involved large funds and were easily targeted for profit by offenders and organized criminal groups.

This exposes the disaster in Hong Fu to another level of engineering oversight: how does the huge maintenance costs go to the builders, the consulting firms and the relevant stakeholders?

Major maintenance works involve solicitation, contracts, procurement of materials, supervision of works and final acceptance. Each of these links may affect the cost to the population and the safety of the building.

When the benefit of the works is put first, it is possible to reduce the cost of materials, use non-compliant materials, circumvent oversight, etc.

The Hongfeng Independent Commission has directed its main work responsibilities to the contractor Prestige Construction & Engineering and the engineering consultant Will Power Architects. The companies and persons concerned have faced criminal charges and the final criminal liability is still subject to judicial proceedings.

However, the contractor and the consulting firm are not independent institutions that exist outside the regulatory framework.

The Government sets building safety standards, authorizes relevant professionals to conduct inspections and empowers the regulatory authorities to enforce the law.

If engineering companies are able to carry out construction work on a permanent basis using false professional documents, lapsed oversight and irregular material, then government regulation is not actually binding and is itself an important part of the disaster.

The significance of safety regulation in construction is not so much that the Government can keep a record of inspections as it is about the ability to detect risks in a timely manner and to prevent it from harming the population.

Today, Jia Chao Li has announced the promotion of the criminalization of the general-marks, the proposed imposition of a maximum fine of HK$ 10 million for serious offences and 10 years ' imprisonment, and the establishment of a new inter-agency law enforcement and building maintenance regulatory agency.

These reforms in turn proved that the regulatory system in the past had significant shortcomings.

The problem is that the reforms introduced after 168 people have died cannot be a substitute for full accountability for past regulatory failures.

Hong Kong, under the high control of Beijing, is facing a more serious test of public surveillance

The Hongfeng fire has taken place in a period of significant changes in the political environment in Hong Kong.

Since the implementation of the National Security Act of 2020 and the entry into force of the National Security Ordinance of 2024, Beijing has been strengthening its control over political life, public expression and social organization in Hong Kong.

The Government has a strong executive capacity and is also able to mobilize the police, the Independent Commission Against Corruption and a number of regulatory bodies to undertake large-scale operations.

However, during the long-term maintenance of Hong Fook Tung, administrative supervision did not show the same level of effective action in the face of constant fire safety concerns expressed by the population.

This exposes a power allocation issue in Hong Kong governance that deserves to be examined in depth: the Government can pool its resources to maintain political security, but not necessarily to effectively protect the basic security of the population in their daily lives.

It must be emphasized that the independent investigation report of Hong Fok-jin did not identify the specific irregularities that led to the fire, either directly or through the Beijing Government ' s direct direction or involvement.

However, the Beijing-led political governance structure in Hong Kong and the mechanisms for public accountability by the Hong Kong executive still require independent public oversight.

In particular, against the backdrop of a significant weakening of political opposition, the closure of some independent media and more restrictions on civil society activities, the sustainability of investigations into major public security incidents cannot rely solely on the Government ' s own initiative to disclose much of the material.

Although the Commission of Inquiry published over a thousand pages of its report, some of it was covered up by criminal prosecution and the full report was not yet made public.

The Government undertook to publish the full text of the criminal justice process after its completion. This means that material involving certain specific responsibilities and evidence is still not fully accessible to the public.

For the families of the deceased, they need, in addition to a political apology, an open, transparent and genuinely accountable judicial and administrative process.

One hundred sixty-eight lives, not just one bow

The Government indicated that the Independent Commission had proposed 120 reforms that would facilitate the comprehensive restructuring of construction regulation, the fight against the siege, complaints and sectoral accountability mechanisms.

While political reform and administrative reform are important, the damage left by the Great Fry Fire is first and foremost inflicted on a common family.

The 168 deaths meant that 168 lives could not be restarted. Nearly 2,000 families were affected, meaning that many inhabitants were forced to leave their original homes and to return to housing, property, work and family life arrangements.

In September 2026, the Hong Kong Government began to promote special home-purchase arrangements for affected owners. However, no development of housing can replace the accountability of those responsible and responsible for the disaster.

The most unacceptable place for this fire is where the danger is not entirely unpredictable.

Residents have warned that the supervisory authority has inspection powers, that the participants in the works have professional responsibilities and that there are a large number of ordinary families living in buildings that do not have the capacity to inspect fire-proof materials themselves.

From complaints by residents to regulatory reports, from the network to fire-fighting facilities, any link that is effectively corrected may change the outcome of the disaster.

The fact that a Government finally admits its mistakes collectively cannot be a proof that its responsibilities have been fulfilled.

The political responsibility of Lee and Ho Yong-hyun is only part of the process of accountability of Hong Fu-hyun. More importantly, all specific persons and institutions involved in illegal procurement, negligence, false documents, failures in fire safety supervision and suspected crimes are legally liable for their actions.

The fire in Hongfu has been extinguished and the investigation report has been made public. However, true justice for 168 deceased persons and their families remains dependent on the Government's ability to translate every major regulatory error in the report into a verifiable determination of responsibility.

What Hong Kong needs is a government that can protect its inhabitants before a disaster occurs, not a comprehensive administrative system that is declared only after major casualties have occurred.

China will continue to follow up on the follow-up of the investigation report by Hong Fok-hyeong, the administrative investigation by the government department, the related criminal cases and the progress of the resettlement and compensation of the families of the victims.