The CCP Anti-Transborder Corruption Act is fully in force: the National Monitoring Board is responsible for cross-border pursuit, and for the integration of offshore investigations, funds and data into the jurisdiction

The legal system of the CCP ' s anti-corruption powers is being further extended beyond national borders.

On 13 November, the People ' s daily newspaper published in full the Law of the People ' s Republic of China on Combating Cross-Border Corruption. This is the reason. Xi Jinping The law promulgated by Presidential Decree No. 89 on 6 November and officially in force on that day, contains 6 chapters 47, covering cross-border corruption identification, case investigation, international pursuit, recovery of assets outside the country, corporate integrity compliance and legal liability.

The most interesting provisions appear in chapter II. Article 8 of the new law clearly states that the national mechanism for combating cross-border corruption is led by the National Monitoring Committee, which functions in concert with the foreign affairs, public security, finance, commerce, money-laundering, financial regulation, and Internet-based mechanisms, and establishes information-sharing mechanisms.

At the same time, article 15 provides for the integration of monitoring information by the relevant authorities using technology such as big data and artificial intelligence, article 17 gives the authorities the competence to collect and access evidence, and article 21 lists 12 types of mutual legal assistance matters, such as financial accounts, home searches, freezing of property and access to electronic data, to foreign authorities.

The institutional significance of this law lies in the fact that the Communist Party has further integrated its anti-corruption powers, which were previously decentralized in party monitoring, public security investigations, financial regulation and international judicial cooperation, into a cross-border law enforcement system led by the National Monitoring Board.

Fighting corruption and recovering illicit assets has a legitimate public interest base. But the powers of the anti-corruption bodies, who can control them and the independent avenues of redress that ordinary people enjoy in the face of an investigation determine equally how a law works.

For the CCP, which has long controlled public officials through the party disciplinary inspection and the State inspection mechanism, this legislation reinforces a distinct institutional feature: the core organizational structure for cross-border anti-corruption efforts is the Ombudsman, while the principle of political leadership is directly enshrined in the law.

From Skynet "Fox Hunt" to special legislation: Cross-border pursuits form a complete chain of institutions

International recovery efforts in Beijing have been ongoing for many years.

Since 2014, the Chinese public security organs have continued to promote the Fox Hunting operation, which has led to the formation of a system of operations for Skynet, led by the Central Anti-Corruption Coordination Mechanism. These actions cover the areas of offshore pursuit, asset recovery, offshore funds transfer investigations and foreign judicial cooperation.

On 2 April 2026, the International Office for the Control of Stolen and Cross-border Corruption of the Central Anti-Corruption Coordination Group announced the launch of Operation Skynet 2026.

The functions of the various bodies were clearly defined at the time of deployment: the National Monitoring and Monitoring Board led the recovery of stolen property from abroad; the Ministry of Public Security was responsible for special operations to “fox-hunt”, the People's Bank of China and the Ministry of Public Security jointly investigated and investigated the transfer of funds from offshore companies and underground money houses, and the Central Organization Department, in conjunction with the Public Security and Immigration Administration, dealt with so-called “naked officials” and public officials who had violated the law.

A new law, which was introduced on 6 November, further integrated such cross-sectoral arrangements into the legal system.

Under article 12, the Ombudsman will work with the relevant authorities to strengthen the monitoring of the acquisition of foreign nationality, the eligibility for permanent residence abroad and the permanent residence permit by public officials, and to improve the system for reporting foreign deposits and investments.

Articles 13 and 14 incorporate financial transaction monitoring, auditing, taxation and asset transfer leads into efforts to counter cross-border corruption. When suspicious transactions are detected, the relevant authorities must, as required, transmit the materials to the inspection or public security bodies.

Under article 18, the investigating authorities may also, in accordance with the law, take measures to restrict the exit of persons suspected of corruption from China.

The links covered by this mechanism are quite complete:

• Identity and immigration control: Qualifications for public officials to stay abroad, entry and exit of individuals and measures to prevent flight.

-The monitoring of funds and assets: Bank transactions, offshore companies, underground money houses and investments abroad. - Case trail integration: Inspection, public security, auditing, taxation, finance and web information. - Cross-border investigations and recovery: Outsiders search, account search, evidence acquisition and recovery of property. Institutional coordination: Under the unified leadership of the National Monitoring Board, with the participation of the local monitoring boards and the relevant administrative bodies.

Cross-border corruption cases, which had previously required the coordination of multiple departments, now had a unified legal framework. The scope of the supervisory powers also extends from monitoring the conduct of public officials to more complex cross-border networks of funds and business relationships.

The most alarming Article 15: A.I. Access to the monitoring information system

Article 15 is easily concealed by ambitious anti-corruption narratives throughout the law, but directly relates to the technical shape of the future investigative powers.

The article requires the relevant authorities to use information technology, such as big data and artificial intelligence, to integrate the oversight information available to different departments and to conduct comprehensive analyses, risk warning and problem detection.

This means that the inspection bodies no longer rely solely on reporting, auditing and case investigations to find clues, but can also analyse financial flows, personnel relations and other information related to the risks of corruption through the integration of cross-sectoral data.

In modern governance, technical aid surveys are not special in themselves. The financial supervisory authority has a legitimate use of the unusual transaction model to identify the risk of money-laundering.

What really needs to be examined is who defines the purpose of the information when a large number of individuals, businesses and financial information enters the same system of analysis led by the inspection body, who corrects the misidentification and who is responsible for the misuse of the data.

Article 15 of the new law imposes a duty of confidentiality on staff members with respect to business secrets, personal privacy and personal information. However, the article does not provide for a detailed independent review of the algorithm risk judgement, nor does it establish a separate mechanism for the redress of individuals who are wrongly linked to the corruption investigation.

Once cross-border financial transactions, kinship and business connections are included in the risk screening, the target of investigation may be extended from those directly suspected of having committed violations to those with whom a large number of economic or social contacts have been made.

Such powers require, in particular, transparent procedural constraints.

However, the new law does not establish a cross-border anti-corruption oversight body independent of the existing oversight and administrative system. The collection, integration, analysis and follow-up of anti-corruption data continue to rely primarily on the internal functioning of the existing State power system.

Beijing demands evidence from foreign countries, but limits foreign independent investigations in China

Article 21 of the new law gives the relevant Chinese authorities the legal basis for extensive requests for international legal assistance.

In accordance with the provisions of the law, China may apply to foreign institutions for the search of persons, the search of bank accounts, the taking of testimony, the search of residence, the retrieval of electronic data and the seizure, seizure and freezing of property.

Articles 23 and 24 further provide for the possibility of pursuing the proceeds of crime through extradition, repatriation, prosecution abroad and judicial cooperation.

These actions are subject to the relevant national laws, international treaties or cooperative arrangements between the parties. Chinese domestic legislation cannot unilaterally give Chinese law enforcement officials the power to enter foreign territory to search, arrest or freeze property.

However, article 25 of the new law shows a very clear restrictive position on the issue of external investigations.

Under this article, no foreign agency, organization or individual may carry out, on their own initiative, anti-cross-border corruption investigations in China or through other persons without the consent of the relevant Chinese authorities. Institutions and individuals in China are also severely restricted in providing evidence, data and assistance outside China.

This has resulted in a noteworthy institutional arrangement.

Beijing hopes to obtain offshore financial accounts, business records and personal information through international judicial cooperation, while keeping the active powers of foreign investigative agencies to enter Chinese investigations firmly in the hands of the Chinese authorities concerned.

International judicial cooperation was inherently based on respect for the judicial sovereignty of the host country. China ' s demand that foreign agencies comply with its own law enforcement procedures does not violate this fundamental principle.

The problem is that article 6 of the new Chinese law also establishes a counter-measure provision: when foreign countries take measures that are deemed by China to be extraterritorially inappropriate, discriminatory or detrimental to China ' s national interests on the grounds of anti-corruption, Beijing may take counter-measures or block measures, including under the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Act.

When foreign investigations involve Chinese State-owned enterprises, officials or business interests with a political background, cases may enter both the legal framework of anti-corruption cooperation and national security counter-measures.

Under the design of such a system, anti-corruption investigations are both a judicial issue and a policy tool in the context of diplomatic and State conflicts of interest.

For foreign regulatory bodies, the decision to transfer evidence to China must be accompanied by procedural safeguards in China ' s judicial system, the scope of use of evidence and the rights of the person against whom the complaint is brought, in addition to taking into account the facts of the funds involved and corruption.

Operation Fox has a criminal case in the United States, leaving another record of cross-border law enforcement

While Beijing interpreted the overseas run-off as fighting corruption and defending national interests, some of China ' s recent out-of-country run-off operations had already triggered criminal proceedings in the United States.

On 19 March 2025, the United States Federal Court for the Eastern District of New York sentenced Quanzhhong An to 20 months ' imprisonment. The United States Department of Justice stated that he had participated in a transnational operation directed by the Chinese Government to force the persons concerned to return to China by harassing United States residents and their families.

The case was explicitly classified by the United States Department of Justice as illegal forced repatriation in the context of Operation Fox. The Court also decided on the financial penalty for compensation and fines, which was imposed on Ann in 2024.

On 16 April of the same year, Michael McMaahon, a personal investigator who had served as the New York Police Commissioner, was also sentenced to 18 months ' imprisonment for his involvement in a follow-up and forcible return operation against United States residents.

These cases suggest that cross-border flight may face a completely different legal evaluation under different jurisdictions.

The relevant Chinese authorities believe that they are pursuing suspected offenders, while the United States judicial authorities are concerned about whether Chinese government agents and their collaborators have committed any stalking, harassment, threats or other offences in the United States without authorization.

The pursuit of persons suspected of corruption does not confer on any State the prerogative to circumvent the local judicial system in order to impose coercive acts on foreign territory.

While the new law provides for the pursuit of the proceeds of crime through legal channels of cooperation, its institutional environment continues the policy of international pursuit that the CPC has consistently promoted.

For Chinese abroad, the most important safeguard is not an allegation from the Chinese authorities, but the ability of the local judiciary to independently judge the facts of the case, its legal nature and the risks faced by the persons concerned.

Chinese companies are sailing and are also included in the new monitoring and compliance system

This legislation is not only directed at the fugitive officials.

Articles 29 to 34 establish a special chapter on corporate integrity compliance, which includes the relevant obligations of Chinese enterprises operating across borders, as well as branches and subsidiaries of foreign enterprises established in China.

Enterprises must establish a system of integrity compliance, conduct due diligence with third-party cooperation agencies, improve internal reporting mechanisms and strengthen financial management of offshore branches.

State-owned enterprises are subject to more explicit regulatory requirements, including significant external funds, risk-control for major projects and important positions, and measures such as the posting of finance managers, rotation of personnel, conflict of interest evasion.

For private enterprises, the new law means that cross-border business compliance is no longer a mere business risk management, but a statutory obligation.

Article 45 further provides that enterprises that refuse to comply with the requirements of integrity compliance may face suspension, closure or even revocation of business permits.

This penalty regime gives the competent authorities the power to intervene directly in the business activity.

While anti-commercial bribery systems would have helped to preserve market equity, how to prevent compliance investigations from becoming a selective enforcement tool in an environment where the CCP political system is highly involved in business management is also a problem that institutional oversight must face.

In particular, when cross-border commercial transactions involve State-owned enterprises, government approval, major infrastructure and politically sensitive industries, the risks of compliance by enterprises are often closely linked to the executive power.

The institutions that have licensing, licensing and market access powers themselves lack effective external oversight, unilaterally reinforcing corporate responsibility and making it difficult to touch upon the full range of institutional conditions for the trading of power-producing money.

Who monitors the power to fight corruption: the law incorporates human rights principles without changing the oversight system

Article 3 of the Law on Cross-Border Corruption clearly states that the fight against cross-border corruption is under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and is based on a general national security perspective.

Article 5 incorporates the principles of compliance with legal procedures, respect for and protection of human rights, and protection of the legitimate interests of enterprises.

The institutional positioning of the law has been clearly demonstrated by the combination of the two provisions.

The law places political leadership at the heart of cross-border anti-corruption efforts, while requiring that specific law enforcement activities comply with legal procedures. This arrangement continues the CCP model of governance that combines the party leadership system with the State oversight power.

Article 8 assigns the National Monitoring Board with a central coordinating role, while article 46 establishes legal responsibility for the abuse of authority, negligence or disclosure of personal information by staff of the Inspectorate, the Public Security and other organs.

However, the entire law does not establish a new external oversight body independent of the National Monitoring Committee, nor does it establish a complete special remedy procedure for possible erroneous identification, offshore property disputes or data misuse in cross-border investigations.

The relevant guarantees of rights still depend on the existing judicial and administrative legal system.

This is the central issue between the functioning of the legal system and the actual powers.

If anti-corruption agencies can influence both the screening of leads, investigative measures, international cooperation and asset recovery, then oversight of the investigation process cannot rely solely on accountability within the same administrative and political system.

A truly effective anti-corruption system that is capable of prosecuting corrupt officials and that allows those under investigation to counter false accusations and abuse of power through an independent process.

Under the existing political system in China, the Central Disciplinary Commission and the National Monitoring Board are co-located, and the oversight powers are closely linked to the disciplinary system within the Communist Party. The work of the National Monitoring Board is again placed under the central and unified leadership of the party.

This power structure gives a distinct political organization to cross-border corruption investigations.

The offshore assets of a public official, the overseas transactions of an enterprise and even third party personnel who have links to those funds may be brought into the system of investigations led by the inspection authorities.

The extent to which they are afforded procedural protection will have a direct impact on the practical consequences of this law.

Fight against corruption and the power of oversight remains centralized within the system

On 13 November, 47 laws were published in the Daily People ' s newspaper, which demonstrated a systemic integration of the cross-border anti-corruption mechanisms of the Chinese Communist Party.

The National Monitoring Committee has been given a clearer basis for organizing and coordinating the cross-sectoral work from offshore accounts to overseas assets, from persons to international legal assistance, from corporate integrity compliance to high-data risk analysis.

International prosecution of serious corruption and recovery of illegally transferred public assets are in themselves in line with public expectations of a Government of integrity. Chinese society has long been plagued by the problems of rent-seeking, the transmission of benefits and corruption, and there is certainly a real need to establish an effective cross-border anti-corruption system.

But the practical effect of an anti-corruption law ultimately depends on how it treats power.

For the Communist Party of China, the new law strengthens the organizational position of the National Monitoring Board in cross-border governance, combining financial regulation, corporate compliance, international flight and information technology in the same national surveillance system.

For ordinary people and businesses, the most direct change is that investigative authorities may have more information about their operations abroad, financial flows and social links, and that they may promote the relevant investigative measures through international cooperation.

China ' s cross-border anti-corruption capacity is being provided with more complete legal tools, and the independent oversight structure of this system of powers has not fundamentally changed.

Xi Jinping The Government has extended the legal tentacles of anti-corruption to all parts of the world, but it continues to concentrate on the key powers that determine the direction of investigations, organize law enforcement and impose liability within the CCP-led monitoring system.

This is the institutional change that deserves the most public attention after the enactment of the Cross-Border Corruption Act.