Moscow brings Beijing narrative to Taipei: Chinese-Russian cognitive war collaboration behind a 20-person show

In early September, the representative of the Moscow Taipei Economic and Cultural Coordination Committee in Taipei broadcasted the 1945 Soviet documentary “The Defeat of Japanese Militarism” in the centre of Taipei, with the Chinese title “Destroying Japanese Militarism”. Taiwan believes that this is not a mere historical and cultural activity, but that Russia is assisting Beijing in expanding the narrative of the “resurrection of Japanese militarism” in an attempt to undermine Taiwan’s relations and political mutual trust between Taiwan and Western partners.

What is truly remarkable is not the number of spectators, but the propaganda carrier entering Taiwan local. Beijing has long used the history of the anti-Japanese war to build the legitimacy of the regime, and has repeatedly portrayed Japan as an external threat to attempt to return to militarism in times of tension in the Taiwan Sea. Today, the story is not only exported through Chinese official media, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the overseas war platform, but is directly brought into the Taipei social space by the official Russian Taiwanese agency.

Russian agencies in Taiwan shift from low-cost diplomacy to proactive narrative exports

Official data from the Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs show that the agency is a factual representative of Russia in Taiwan, with current representative Pavel Lapin. Reuters reports that Russian diplomats in Taiwan have been relatively low since the 2022 Russian military invasion of Ukraine, but the event was personally organized by the agency, with Deputy Representative Sergey Chudodeev and staff present, and refused Reuters journalists to enter, and the activity was limited to invited people.

One participant also said that after the show ended, Pavel Lapin said he hoped to continue to host similar events in the future. This means it was not an accidental show, but it could be a test of the Russian agency’s expanding political historical narrative activity.

The film focuses on the role of the Soviet military in the war against Japan, the atrocities of the Japanese war and the Soviet "victory over militarism"; the Russian side emphasizes the sacrifices of the Soviet Union and the Chinese people in the war in the campaign propaganda, and puts itself in the historical camp of common "anti-militarism" with China.

Beijing is using “Japanese threat theory” as a tool to differentiate Taiwan

The event was followed by the rising political friction between Beijing and Tokyo over Taiwan’s security issues. Japanese Prime Minister Gao Ming said earlier that if China attacked Taiwan, it could trigger Japan’s military response under certain circumstances. Beijing then continued to describe Japan’s strengthening defence as a “militaristic recurrence” in an attempt to link today’s Japanese security policy with the history of World War II aggression.

In recent years, Taiwan and Japan’s ties in politics, security, disaster relief, economic trade and civil exchanges have strengthened, and Japan is also one of Taiwan’s important external partners in responding to Chinese military pressure. If Beijing can re-package Taiwan-Japan security cooperation into “Japanese militarism penetrating Taiwan,” it can build uncertainty within Taiwan from historical sentiment.

This is why a closed-door show for 20 people still has political significance.Cognitive warfare does not necessarily pursue the mass spread of one-field activities; it can first enter small networks of academics, former journalists, business people and other public figures, then spread through social media, commentary programs and secondary spread.

The Chinese-Russian narrative begins to show clear division of labor.

Russia and the Communist Party are not exactly the same interests in historical issues, but in weakening the United States, Japan and its partnerships, the two sides are increasingly able to share propaganda material. Beijing emphasizes “China’s victory in the war” and the history of Japan’s aggression, while Moscow reinforces the Soviet narrative of defeating Japan and the postwar order; both ultimately point to the same realistic political goal – to shape Japan into a dangerous country that is re-militarizing.

This collaboration does not require an open "joint propaganda directive". From the point of view of the dissemination mechanism, the most effective way is to use similar dialectics, historical symbols and political topics separately by multiple national institutions to create information pressure in the same direction among different audiences.

The chain of publicity responsibility can be clearly identified: Beijing provides real political issues with the framework of “Japanese militarism”, Russian official agencies provide Soviet historical material and local activity carriers, then secondary dissemination by invited communities and networks. This pattern is easier to disguise as “historic discussion” or “cultural exchange” than direct broadcasting Chinese official media content.

Taiwan's freedom of speech becomes an open entrance to authoritarian propaganda

A democratic society will not ban the broadcast because of the political stance of a film, which is the fundamental difference between Taiwan and the Chinese-Russian regime.Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed respect for legal and normal exchanges, while emphasizing the activities of foreign institutions should respect historical facts and the values of democracy and freedom.

The problem with an open society is not in allowing different historical views to emerge, but in allowing authoritarian states to use this openness to package national propaganda into ordinary civic expressions. China-Russia can publicly spread its political narratives in Taiwan, while Taiwanese media, dissidents or anti-war voices do not have a space for mutual dissemination in mainland China and Russia. This asymmetry itself is an important condition for cognitive warfare.

Taiwan's response should therefore not focus on blocking films, but on public organizers, funding, dissemination pathways, audience networks and relations with foreign governments. Only by clearly identifying the source of national propaganda can the public judge whether the independent views are seen in front of them or whether the political dissemination is promoted by foreign regimes.

History has been reworked, the purpose remains today's Taiwanese politics

The Chinese Communist Party’s narrative of the history of the Second World War has long had a politized contradiction: the Chinese government at the time really represented China’s acceptance of Japan’s surrender and assuming the main responsibility for the positive battlefield, but the Chinese Communist Party continued to incorporate “the victory of the war” into its ruling legitimacy after the establishment of the regime in 1949.

This small-scale event should therefore not be understood as a typical film show. It reflects China-Russia strategic cooperation extending from the military, energy and diplomatic levels to the historical narrative and cognitive space. When the Russian agencies in Taiwan began to actively bring highly matched political discourse to Taiwan, China-Russia cooperation had touched the information environment within Taiwan society.

Beijing can’t change the political choices of Taiwanese people by military aircraft and warships alone, so it continues to look for less costly ways to influence. Historical memory, Japanese sentiment, fear of war and distrust of allies are becoming materials that can be repeatedly processed. Moscow’s 20th show in Taipei is small, but shows the mechanism fairly clearly: Military threats are being pressured outside the Strait, and political narratives are trying to enter Taiwan society.