The first island chain is no longer just a map concept: Wu Zhi warned China to link military exercises, naval police and legal warfare into an expansion front.

In Taipei Security Dialogue 2026 on September 9, Taipei National Security Council Secretary-General Wu Qing said that the first island chain has become the frontline of Chinese expansionism, while Taiwan is the focus of Beijing’s continuously increasing coercion. He listed not a single military indicator, but a set of simultaneously operating pressure tools: the U.S. Army’s high-intensity military exercises, the naval police and investigative ships’ gray zone operations, the submarine cable and outer island waters incidents, and the advancement of law and diplomacy under the “one-in-one principle.” If these actions are looked apart, they are like a series of local frictions; putting them on the same strategic map is seen as a long-term project to gradually change the behavior

The first island chain is turning from geographical denomination to a reality pressure line.

The so-called first island chain, which extends from the Japanese islands through Taiwan to the Philippines, is an important geographical framework for the United States and its allies to discuss security in the Western Pacific for a long time.For Beijing, breaking the chain means that the Liberation Army’s maritime and air forces can enter the Western Pacific more freely and improve the ability to prevent U.S. troops from intervening in the Taiwan and South China Sea crises.

Wu Jin pointed out that Chinese naval activities are no longer limited to nearshore, but are simultaneously expanding in the Sea of Japan, the South China Sea, the Strait of Taiwan and the Western Pacific Ocean. This makes the Taiwan issue no longer just a partial risk of conflict between the two shores, but a direct connection to security in Japan, the Philippines and the United States.

The real strategic value of the first island chain is not to draw a line on the map, but to know who controls the ports, straits, airspace, communications and supply nodes on the line in the event of a crisis.

Beijing’s most effective tool is not necessarily the navy, but the ongoing pressure below the war threshold.

The major military exercises of the Liberation Army are most easily attracted to the screen, but the real changes to the daily security environment are often the maritime police, surveillance ships, drones and legal rules. Wu said that the Chinese maritime police have been highly armed and used for expansion operations below the war threshold. Similar patterns have emerged around Taiwan, Fiji Island and the South China Sea: not declaring war, but continuing to expand; informal blockade, but continuing to test navigation and law enforcement borders.

This pattern has at least four levels of pressure simultaneously:

• Military layer : military aircraft, warships and exercises to increase the uncertainty of "development by war";
• law enforcement layer : the Maritime Police establishes a long-term presence in the name of administrative enforcement;
• legal layer: shaping legal claims through domestic law, maps and "one-China" narratives;
• diplomatic layer: suppressing Taiwan's international involvement and putting term and policy pressure on third-country institutions.

The real goal is to turn “abnormal” into “normal.”

Beijing’s strategic patience is reflected in the fact that it doesn’t have to accomplish all its goals at once. Military aircraft crossing the middle line of the Strait once will be seen as a crisis; if it occurs for years in a row, it may be seen as everyday by the outside world. Marine police enter sensitive waters, military ships circumvent the island, drones approach the island, and can also gradually normalize the originally unacceptable behavior by frequency.

This is where the grey-zone strategy is the hardest to deal with. Democracies usually have clear red lines for warfare, but it is harder to design equally clear responses to tens of meters of pressure to move forward every day. Each single event does not seem to be sufficient to escalate, but cumulative outcomes can significantly change the status quo.

* Collective deterrence is not a slogan, but to prevent Beijing from pressuring one by one.

Wu Jin called on democratic partners to strengthen collective deterrence, and its logic is clear: Taiwan alone faces China's size challenge, Japan alone deals with the pressure of the East Sea, and the Philippines alone deals with the friction of the South China Sea, and it is also easy to be managed by Beijing separately. if intelligence sharing, maritime police cooperation, joint training, logistics and industrial supply chain can connect, China will be more difficult to cut every dispute into "bilateral issues".

But collective deterrence also has its own risks. If nations only emphasize solidarity in their statements and are reluctant to bear the cost in a crisis, they may give Beijing the wrong signal. True credible deterrence requires visibility, including ammunition inventories, unmanned systems, decentralized bases, maritime law enforcement coordination, communication resilience and political decision-making mechanisms.

“Taiwan cannot only wait for allies, it must also make itself a target that is difficult to coerce.”

“Rendering is not an option” is the most pronounced political expression in Wu’s speech, but the will to defend is ultimately implemented into the system and resources. Taiwan has in recent years raised the defense budget, developed drones, strengthened reserve mobilization and energy resilience, which is an attempt to get Beijing to face higher uncertainty costs.

Focus on China believes that the real sign of the first island chain entering a dangerous phase is not a sudden outbreak of war one day, but military, maritime, legal and information pressures have been integrated by Beijing into long-term policy tools. If democracies still deal with each military exercise, each maritime entry, and every legal statement separately, it is easy to miss out on the strategic outcomes of these actions.

Beijing is trying to prove that time is on its side, while Taiwan and its partners must prove that continued pressure does not automatically come in exchange for political concessions. The key to deterrence is not to make war look closer, but to convince the Chinese leadership that it is impossible to change the status quo at a low cost, whether it be through military ships, naval police or legal warfare.