No violence is still punishable: How the CPC case pushed six-four memories and political claims into "subversion crimes"

The Hong Kong Branch Association "incitement to subversion of state power" was sentenced on September 11th. Zhou Zhou was sentenced to seven years and three months in prison, Li Xiao was sentenced to seven years and Hu Jian Jin was sentenced to five years and two months; the already dissolved Hong Kong Citizen Support Federation for the Patriotic Democracy Movement was fined with 1.5 million Hong Kong dollars.

Three people in jail, organizing fines: what does today’s sentence mean?

The association has long hosted the Sixth and Fourth Candlestick Party in Hong Kong, and is known for political proposals such as commemorating the Sixth and Fourth, demanding the liquidation of civilian traffic and "ending the one-party dictatorship".With Beijing implementing the "Hong Kong National Security Law" in 2020, this political organization that had been public for decades was eventually dissolved under huge pressure, and its core figures were later faced with criminal prosecution under the National Security Law.

The outcome of this sentence is:

• Zhou Zhou: imprisonment for 7 years and 3 months; Li Zhou: imprisonment for 7 years; Ho Jin Jin: imprisonment for 5 years and 2 months; Hong Kong Branch Association: a fine of 1.5 million Hong Kong dollars.

Hong Kong Radio that the court classified the case as "serious circumstances", using seven years and six months as the starting point of sentence, and then adjusted the sentence according to the circumstances of each defendant.

Second, there is no violence, why is it still classified as “serious” subversion?

The case is most worthy of legal inquiries because of the court’s “serious” understanding. Hong Kong Radio’s report on the grounds for the sentence shows that the case does not involve violence or the threat of use of violence, nor does it offer specific methods and timetables for implementing the political objectives.

This is precisely what constitutes the most iconic legal issue in the case: when there is no armed action, no violent plan, and no specific timetable for taking power, the core of criminal responsibility is more focused on the long-term political assertions expressed and promoted by the case and its capacity to mobilize society.

A political proposition without violence, without threats of violence, without concrete implementation plans and timetables, why could it ultimately lead to more than seven years of severe sentences?

This is not an abstract legal debate, but a question of where the boundaries of Hong Kong’s political expression are being pushed.When “end the one-party dictatorship,” commemorating the Sixteenth and long-standing political activities promoting democratic reforms can be included in serious subversion cases, the scope of the Hong Kong National Security Law system’s punishment has gone far beyond the criminal defence line in the traditional sense of violent seizure of power.

From the Candlestick to the National Security Court: Hong Kong's political space has been changed

For decades, it has been publicly operating; every six or four years, a large number of Hong Kong citizens have lit candles in Victoria Park to commemorate the deaths of the 1989 Beijing Democratic Movement.

With the implementation of the National Security Act, this space quickly disappeared: the Six-Four Candlesticks party could not continue, the Confederation was dissolved, and a number of Democrats and social activists were arrested, prosecuted or long-term detention. Today’s Confederation sentences are one of the judicial endpoints of this political transformation: the political slogans that could once be cried out publicly can now be an important part of the national security case.

In case: National Security Law is redefining the boundaries of “legitimate political opposition”

One of the most cautious circumstances of modern criminal law is that the concept of national security is expanding, making the boundary between political opinions, organizational activities and the real implementation of violent subversion increasingly blurred.

The association law leaves at least three legal issues to be addressed:

• Where is the boundary between political claims and criminal acts? If a long-term, publicly expressed political goal can itself be an important foundation for severe punishment, the legitimate space for political opposition is necessarily fundamentally changed.
• How is the scale of "severe circumstances" established? The severity of severe punishment still applies in cases where there is no violence or threat of violence, meaning that "severe punishment" is more due to political goals, organizational influence and duration.
• How much substantial space remains for freedom of expression under the National Security Act? When the criminal consequences reach five to seven years or more in prison, the effect of cold fever is not limited to the defendant, but spreads to the entire society.

That’s why the CPC case cannot be understood as just a question of three persons in prison. It’s actually a ruling about Hong Kong’s political expression of new borders.

Hong Kong under Xi Jinping: The rule of law is leaving political security

Beijing has always described the Hong Kong National Security Act as a necessary system to restore Hong Kong’s stability and safeguard national security.But the Convention has another side: When a non-violent political organization faces a severe punishment for subversive crimes because of its long-standing initiatives for democratic reform, commemoration of the Sixteenth and opposition to the rule of the Communist Party of China, the boundaries of so-called “national security” have actually entered the realm of thought, memory and political stance.

Since Xi Jinping came to power, the Communist Party has steadily strengthened the priority of “political security” in national governance. Hong Kong’s original institutional values – freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, and allowing opponents to oppose the rule publicly – are increasingly being placed under the national security logic.

Not just a few laws were truly changed, but Hong Kong’s past relied onining the basic principles of an open society: Government can be publicly opposed, ruling parties can be criticized, history can be publicly commemorated, and political systems can be publicly advocated to change.

As these acts begin to carry criminal risks to national security, the systemic differences promised by “one country, two systems” are substantially eroded.

Xi Jinping: Executor of the Political Security Line from the Hong Kong Autonomous Government to Beijing

He has long served as chief executive in the Hong Kong police and security system and became the chief executive in the political structure after the implementation of the National Security Act. Under his administration, the focus of Hong Kong’s governance has become increasingly clear around national security, political loyalty and so-called “patriotic port governance”.

The role of the Hong Kong government today is difficult to describe as an intermediary inining a high degree of autonomy between Beijing and the Hong Kong society. When the political security line defined by Beijing continues to land through Hong Kong’s police, prosecution system, national security system and administrative machinery, the super-government has in fact increasingly become the local agent and striker of the Xi Jinping regime in implementing political control in Hong Kong.

The worst consequence of this change is that the Hong Kong system itself is gradually losing its ability to protect those who disagree.A truly politically inclusive rule of law society does not need to send non-violent opposition in prison for seven years; a truly confident government does not need to rely on criminal law to eradicate the political memory left by the six-and-four candles.

The three-finger gesture of Zhou Zhang: being pushed is the arm, not the problem left behind in this case

According to the scene news, during the trial, Zhou Zhuang Liang raised the three-finger gesture symbolizing resistance and unity in the Hunger Games to the audience, then was pressed by the punisher's arm, and was prevented from continuing to shake hands.

This brief move left a very symbolic picture for the case.

The courts could be sentenced to seven years and three months in prison, and the punishment officers could also push a raised hand, but could not answer the more fundamental question with physical control: Why should a non-violent political claim be suppressed by years of imprisonment?

What Hong Kong faces today is no longer whether an organization can survive, but whether the city can accommodate public political opposition, historical memory and institutional criticism.

The branches have dissolved, the candlesticks have been suppressed, and a number of democrats have been trapped, but the memory of a society will not disappear automatically because the organization is banned, nor will political opinions disappear due to increased sentences.

Xi Jinping's regime can use the National Security Law to redefine Hong Kong's political space, the super-government can implement the political security system, and courts can also make heavy sentences according to law; but the more these powers need to deal with peaceful political claims through imprisonment, the more it highlights the fundamental regression experienced by Hong Kong's freedom and rule of law.