Belgian chip researcher involved in transferring uranium nitrogen technology to China will be tried: European industrial espionage alarm clock again

The Belgian federal prosecutor revealed on Sept. 7 that a 52-year-old man of double nationality was detained on charges of industrial espionage, illegal transfer of semiconductor trade secrets and will face trial.The man had held senior R&D positions at Belgian chip company BelGaN, and the prosecutor suspected that he was also in charge of a similar company in China and suspected of transferring nitrogen uranium (GaN) semiconductor production technology and intellectual property to China.

Arrested on board flight to Beijing

Reported by Reuters and Reuters.The unnamed man was arrested before May 10 at Brussels-Zafentem airport when he was preparing to board for Beijing and has been detained since then.The investigation is being conducted by the East Flanders Federal Judicial Police, and the Belgian prosecutor is still pursuing another suspect.

The prosecutor said the man was suspected of simultaneously serving as the head of a Chinese chip company during his tenure at BelGaN, which was founded months after he joined BelGaN and was supported by a Chinese investment fund.

It is widely used in the fields of electric vehicles, satellites, radar, aerospace and electronic warfare, so it has both civilian value and obvious strategic and defense significance.

Technical clues from bankruptcy investigation

BelGaN, once one of Belgium’s only commercial microchip manufacturing plants, went bankrupt in 2024, leaving about 400 employees out of work.Belgian media reportsIndustrial espionage clues are gradually emerging in the investigation of corporate bankruptcies and disposal of assets.

Legal issues currently being investigated by prosecutors include espionage, participation in criminal organizations, misuse of company assets and unlawful disclosure of business secrets. These are still criminal charges, the court has not yet ruled guilty; the persons involved in the case enjoy the presumption of innocence according to law.Reported by Financial TimesThe suspect denied the allegations.

European alert to China’s science and technology intelligence activities continues to rise

The case took place in the context of increased strategic technology protection in Europe. Semiconductors, quantum technology, artificial intelligence and civilian dual-use devices have become the focus of EU economic security policy. Belgium has also previously experienced cases of political influence related to Chinese intelligence activities; in 2023, the Belgian prime minister has publicly called China a country that is "sometimes very hostile" after the controversy, and the Chinese side usually denies allegations of espionage against European countries.

For Europe, technological protection is expanding from export controls to internal personnel, investment structures, corporate mergers and research cooperation. In a highly globalized context of advanced chip supply chains, the most sensitive technologies are often not “stolen” from borders, but may be transferred through human movement, corporate governance and data access.

Outside the Red Wall: National industry competition and criminal espionage allegations must be linked with evidence

The Chinese government has placed semiconductor autonomy as a strategic priority and invested large-scale policy and industrial capital; this alone cannot prove specific enterprises or individuals involved in espionage.The key in the Belgian case is whether prosecutors can prove that the persons involved have specifically acquired, copied and transferred protected trade secrets, and whether the relevant Chinese enterprises and funders are aware or involved.

If these allegations are confirmed in the court, it will become an important case in Europe to observe the expansion of China's high-tech industry and cross-border access to technology; if evidence is insufficient, the court should also exclude political presumptions according to law. Faced with the highly intertwined reality of industrial policies, national security and enterprise development under the CCP system, the strongest complaint is not to generalize suspicion, but to fix the flow of funds, employment relations, data records and technology transfer paths as judgmental evidence.