Beijing moves from “fly ban” to “banned storage”: How a private drone is included in capital’s security governance

A Beijing drone user said that he had previously completed the real name registration as requested, and had brought the equipment to the dispatch. After the new rules were introduced, the dispatch did not first contact himself, but directly contacted his parents, requesting the drone to be sent out of Beijing or delivered to the recovery point. The text message received was written very directly: either "posting out of Beijing", or "delivered to the recovery station for recovery".

This is a small scene, but more illustrative than policy documents, of what is changing in Beijing’s drone governance. The focus of the past is “can’t fly” and now has become “can’t own”. From November 15th, Beijing will completely ban individuals and units from holding and storing drones and their core components in administrative areas; transportation, carrying drones into Beijing is also prohibited.

From Sky Control to Private Property Disposal

The new amendment of the regulations for the management of unmanned aircraft in Beijing, adopted by the Standing Committee of the People's Congress of the City of Beijing, divided the administrative area of the city into an unmanned aircraft control airspace, and further stipulated that individuals and units must not in principle hold, store unmanned aircraft and its core components in Beijing, nor must they be transported or carried into Beijing.

The policy design has been aimed not only at flight behavior, but directly into the possession of the items itself.A previously legal purchase, real name registration, or even with the public security to complete information verification equipment, after the new rules entered into force, continuing to stay in the home itself can become a violation.

The Beijing Municipal Government provides three types of disposal channels at the same time: on-site repurchase, waste recycling and shipping out of Beijing, and allows individuals to carry their own equipment out of Beijing. From September 12 to October 31 to complete on-site repurchase, you can receive 30% subsidy at the exchange price, up to 3000 yuan; on-site recycling subsidy 200 yuan; shipping out of Kyoto free of postal fees. From November 1 to 14, the subsidy standard again dropped.

The logic of this system is clear: The government first changes the legal status of the items and then gives the original owner a window to withdraw.

Why a registered device should be "clean out of Beijing"

In May this year, Beijing has implemented the drone information verification system, requiring relevant equipment to carry out real name registration and public security verification.In accordance with the usual governance logic, real name and information verification means that the government has mastered basic information such as equipment owners, models and purposes, and the risk can be managed through identity binding and flight license.

But the new rules didn’t stop at this level.It further selected “global embargo.” which meant governance objectives had shifted from “knowing who’s flying” to “proving to make private devices themselves disappear from Beijing.”

This change is remarkable, as it reveals a typical path of governance of the capital in Xi’s time: When risk is defined as a national security issue, management tends to not be satisfied with normative behavior, but tends to compress the space of existence of the risk carrier itself. The network is so, the social organization is so, and low-air equipment is also emerging similar logic.

Drones, of course, have real security risks. airports, military facilities, party and political organs and large-scale activities need strict airspace protection around, and many cities in the world will also designate a no-fly zone.But Beijing’s new regulation significantly crosses the “no-fly” boundary: even if the equipment has never taken off, as long as it is held or stored by individuals, it will enter the prohibited scope.

Why does the office find parents?

The social platform leaked cases further showed that the system did not only stay in the text of municipal regulations. netizens said that when they registered, they left their own information, but the station then contacted their parents directly, urging drones to be sent out of Beijing or returned to the receiving station as soon as possible; the other party also said that they can go to the door to handle the relevant procedures.

This detail now comes from a public post by the parties, but it is very consistent with the long-standing work of grassroots governance in China: when administrative tasks need to be carried out to individuals, missions, communities and family members tend to be chained into a chain of execution.

For adults, it is symbolic that the police circumvent their own contacts with their parents. The family is not just a private space here, but is also governed at the grassroots level as a resource for social control. This approach is not unfamiliar in stability, visits, religious activities and dissidents management; now, it appears in the process of disposing of a consumer-class drone.

Beijing is turning “capital security” into everyday order

The official documents use the expression “capital security line”.The governance priorities behind it are very clear: Beijing is both a city with more than 20 million people living in it, as well as the seat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Central Military Commission, the State Council and a large number of state organs. For the Xi Jinping regime, Beijing is first the political center, and then the urban space in the ordinary sense.

This also explains why the low-air economy is encouraged in the country while Beijing is moving in the opposite direction. The Chinese government, on the one hand, sees drones, low-air logistics and general aviation as new industrial growth points, and on the other hand, in the capital, the personal possession, transportation and storage are included in strict prohibitions.

This arrangement is not a simple “security and freedom” option; it is truly worth observing how the concept of security has expanded: from a ban on flying near airports to a ban on flying throughout the city; from a ban on flying across the city to a ban on buying and transporting; and from a ban on using, accessing storage and holding in private homes.

A drone that records how the border of governance moves into private life.

When policy enforcement requires police to identify family members, contact family members, and urge equipment to leave Beijing, capital security is no longer just airspace management.It has become a complete chain of governance from regulations, real name registration, public security data to family relations.

What Beijing eventually gets is a more controllable low-air environment. What ordinary residents lose is not just a flight opportunity, but an option to continue possession and preservation of a previously legitimate private property.

One of the most distinctive features of governance in Xi’s era was that the concept of security continuously gained priority and continuously invaded the space that originally belonged to social and personal decisions. The drone was small, but the new rule provided a very specific window of observation: In Beijing, national security no longer only determines what can’t be done, it begins to decide what can be left in the home of ordinary people.