Hong Kong needs to get behind the Walls Bill: the first two systems of a country disappear, possibly the invisible cyber border.

The determination of how much of Hong Kong's “one country, two systems” remains does not have to start with court decisions or political slogans. Open the browser and enter a web site that Beijing does not like, often more directly.

The United States Senator recently introduced the Li Ji-young Internet Freedom Act, which provides users in Hong Kong with VPN, counter-censorship infrastructure and digital security tools. The bill itself cannot change Hong Kong’s laws, but the fact that it has emerged is ironic: an international city that was distinguished from mainland China by the need not to cross the wall now needs to be discussed by foreign parliaments how to help residents bypass the political website blockade.

The Hong Kong network did not become the “Flame Great Wall” of mainland China overnight. Google, YouTube and a large number of overseas media are still regularly accessible. That is why the current changes are more likely to be ignored — the review is not a complete closure, but the first one to disappear, one by one, against political organizations, the six or four memories, the Port of Exile Platform and the website that Beijing considers to be a threat to national security.

This incremental model may be more appropriate for Hong Kong than the one-time full firewall. Governments need not declare a fundamental change in the Internet system, but only a growing “exception”. When exceptions are accumulated to a sufficient degree, the open Internet eventually leaves only one historical label.

The most effective time for web censorship is when users don't even know it's happening

Traditional publication reviews leave clear marks: books are banned, newspapers are suspended and journalists are arrested. The net level is much more quiet. A page cannot be connected, and it may be that the normal user first thought of server failure, network problems or website being closed, rather than government orders.

This lack of transparency makes accountability more difficult to track. The security situation in Hong Kong is a matter of inquiry about the unaccessible CFHK website, and instead of publicly confirming or denying whether the Government has requested a shield, the issue is referred to Internet service providers. The operator can also remain silent.

The result is that a political website is virtually inaccessible, and no institution is publicly required to bear the political costs of “I order the blockade”.

This is the largest difference between the digital and traditional reviews: power can produce results, but it hides the decision process behind the technical failure.

From Apple Daily to ISP, the control points have moved to infrastructure

When Apple Daily was closed, the world was able to see clearly how the State apparatus worked: police searched the editorial office, freezing company assets, arresting management and eventually suspending the newspaper. It was a highly visible political event.

The website blockade does not require such a large law enforcement scene. As long as the law gives the Government the power to require Internet service providers to restrict access, the control points move from inside the press to the communications infrastructure.

This means that journalists do not even need to be arrested and that articles do not need to be deleted. The content could continue to be on a server overseas, but Hong Kong readers simply could not reach it.

For a city that is highly dependent on international finance, professional services and cross-border information flows, the long-term cost of such changes is not just for political activists. The openness of the network is itself a basic indicator for international enterprises to judge whether the Hong Kong system is truly different from mainland China.

Beijing wants to keep the economic interface in Hong Kong, not the political interface

(a) The two-State system under Xi Jinping is developing a clearer structure: economically, Hong Kong continues to assume the responsibility of the renminbi, capital markets, international finance and professional service interfaces; Politically, the institutional differences between Hong Kong and mainland China have continued to shrink.

This model is a real appeal to Beijing. It hoped to retain the function of connecting global capital while eliminating the exemplary role of Hong Kong as a space for free information and political organization for the mainland.

The problem is that the two functions may not necessarily be separated indefinitely. Open financial systems depend on freedom of information, legal predictability and the confidence of international professionals in the boundaries of the system. When Governments can use national security reasons to silence political websites, companies naturally ask: Is it today a human rights organization that can tomorrow turn to research institutions, business databases or websites involving sanctions investigations?

The word "flowing the wall" into Hong Kong policy discussions is a turning point in itself

In the past, Hong Kongers have spoken of “flowing the wall”, usually referring to the experience of the network after entering mainland China. Now, United States parliamentarians have written into a special bill to provide counter-censorship technology for Hong Kong.

This does not mean that Hong Kong will be fully replicating the continent's network control tomorrow, nor does it need to be exaggerated that all international websites are about to be blocked. What is really to be warned is that the political and legal direction has changed: the Government has the power to block, sensitive websites have been blocked, and the lack of transparent procedures prevents the public from knowing who decides, on what basis, and how to challenge.

Often, the disappearance of freedom is not the day when the Government declares that “no freedom will be available from today”. It is more common in the way that one ordinary thing that could have been done yesterday suddenly fails today, while society is learning not to try.

The real danger of opening the Internet in Hong Kong is here. When people become accustomed to certain web sites, some memorials cannot be searched, and certain media can be read only through VPN, the firewall ceases to be a technical system and becomes a daily behavioural training.

If a country, two systems, ultimately left with only financial markets and different currencies, and even ordinary residents need to access a political website to bypass the embargo, then it will retain only economic packaging, not institutional differences as originally promised.