The U.S. turns the AI alliance into a “selection mechanism”: Xi Jinping’s global AI layout has just begun, and Washington begins to block Beijing’s technology friend circle

When Xi Jinping pushed for the establishment of the World AI Cooperation Organization in Shanghai in July, the political signal released by Beijing was clear: After advanced chips and semiconductor equipment continued to be restricted by the United States, China hoped to bypass the U.S.-led technology system to re-establish an international network of AI cooperation to open weight models, manufacturing capabilities and global Southern markets.

Reuters revealed on August 14 that the U.S. State Department is preparing a letter addressed to 35 AI partner countries. The draft is not at the heart of ordinary diplomatic statements, but requires these countries to clearly deal with the relationship between two sets of technology alliances: joining the U.S.-led Pax Silica and joining the competitive AI organization established by Beijing will be considered incompatible by Washington.

The letter, which has not yet been issued officially, needs to be observed alongside several other political puzzles in recent months.

The first is the supply chain.Pax Silica is not just talking about artificial intelligence models, it incorporates advanced semiconductors, data centers, energy, key minerals, high-tech manufacturing and even AI infrastructure investment into the same cooperative framework.Economies such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, the UK, the Netherlands and the EU have joined the system.In other words, the United States is trying to organize the physical foundation on which AI really relies – chips, minerals, power and manufacturing equipment – into a trusted supply chain alliance.

The second is China’s most vulnerable link. Beijing can train large models with international competitiveness and also have a huge engineering staff and manufacturing system, but advanced GPUs, some semiconductor equipment, high-end manufacturing tools and a number of key technology links are still influenced by the United States and its allies.

The third part comes from Kazakhstan. The Central Asian country joined the framework of U.S. Pax Silica and Beijing’s AI cooperation, causing Washington to be clearly alert. The reason is not only the diplomatic position, but Kazakhstan has key mineral resources that are highly concerned by the United States. If a country enters the U.S. supply chain system and establishes a competitive AI partnership with China, it will be difficult for the United States to determine where the relevant investment, technology and resources will eventually flow.

Therefore, this competition has gone beyond the traditional sense of "US-China science and technology war".

The Trump administration’s past measures aimed at Huawei, the core international and advanced GPUs have mainly controlled what enterprises can get. The new trend now emerges is to start asking other countries to decide which technology ecosystem they belong to.

In response to Reuters, the Chinese embassy in the United States opposed the politicization of trade and technology issues, arguing that camping measures would hinder the global development of artificial intelligence.

The problem is that China itself simultaneously incorporates artificial intelligence, data, algorithms and advanced technology into the national security system, and directly connects science and technology autonomy with China's long-term strategic competition.

In the past, a country could buy Chinese communications equipment, acquire U.S. chips, receive European investments, while building research relations with Beijing and Washington separately.As AI is increasingly seen as the next generation of military, industrial and intelligence capability infrastructure, the U.S. is trying to close this strategic vague space.

Xi Jinping hopes to stop China from technological isolation through new international organizations; what Washington is now doing is raising the diplomatic cost of building a technological alliance with Beijing.

Thus, the 35 letters that may be sent are more worthy of Beijing’s attention than a new chip ban.The blockade of the chip ban is a product, and the Alliance exclusion mechanism is competing for which countries are willing to share resources, technology and industrial chains with China in the coming decades.

AI competition has really entered the political stage.