US Pacific Commander meets with commander of the eastern battle zone of the Communist Party of China.

U.S. Pacific Commander Gen. Samuel Paparo and Commander Yang Zhibin of the Chinese Liberation Army’s Eastern War Zone held a face-to-face meeting in Victoria, Canada.Taiwanese media on September 6This encounter again raised a crucial question: While the Chinese Communist Party continues to exert military pressure on Taiwan, can senior generals most directly involved in the Taiwan Sea operational direction establish effective crisis communication?

This is not a general courteous military exchange.The eastern battle zone carries out combat missions in the Taiwan Sea and the eastern direction of China, while the U.S. Pacific Command is responsible for U.S. military operations in the Indo-Pacific region.Both commanders communicate directly, involving precisely the most likely frontier areas of misjudgment and military friction.

Where did the meeting take place?

U.S. Department of Defense ImageThe 28th Indo-Pacific Defense Chiefs Conference was held in Victoria, Canada.Papallo held bilateral and multilateral exchanges with military leaders of many countries during the meeting, including Yang Zhibin.

The two sides described the overall focus of the meeting as strengthening regional security cooperation, partnerships andining communication.

Why is the identity of Jiang Zhibin sensitive?

The Eastern War Zone is one of the five major war zones of the Communist Party of China, and its scope of tasks directly covers the Taiwan Strait.In recent years, China’s military exercises, military aircraft warships and military deterrence against Taiwan have all made the Eastern War Zone an important window for international observation of Beijing’s military policy towards Taiwan.

Therefore, Yang Zhibin’s meeting with Papallo can be understood from three levels:

• Crisis management: Reducing misjudgment in frequent contact with naval and air forces;
• Military signal: the two sides directly point out their respective red lines and security concerns;
• Communication mechanism: testing whether the U.S.-China military high-level channels can remain operational before the crisis occurs.

“Communication does not mean decreased military pressure.”

The U.S.-China re-establishment or maintenance of military communications cannot be explained as Beijing has reduced military pressure on Taiwan.The Taiwan Ministry of Defense has continued to announce joint aircraft and ship activities around Taiwan, and the Chinese Communist Party has not given up its policy tools to threaten Taiwan with force.

Similarly, the U.S. meeting with the Liberation Army generals does not mean that the U.S. accepts Beijing’s claims of sovereignty over Taiwan or the South China Sea.The main value of military communication is precisely this: Even if there are serious strategic differences between the two sides, it is necessary to avoid naval contact or command judgment errors to push competition into uncontrollable conflicts.

The reality behind a meeting photo

U.S. official footage also shows that Mr. Papallo spoke with military leaders from Japan, India, Australia and ASEAN countries during the meeting, reflecting that the U.S. military’s Indo-Pacific strategy is not merely about establishing bilateral communications with Beijing, but also strengthening a network of regional partners.

For the Communist Party of China,ining military communication with the United States can reduce the risk of unexpected conflict; but Beijing may also use military exchanges to demonstrate so-called "big-power relations stability".

Focus on China Observation

The real test of the value of this contact was not whether the two generals shrugged hands, but when an emergency military incident occurred in the Taiwan Sea, whether the two sides received a phone call, whether the information could be accurately transmitted, and whether Beijing was willing to restrict dangerous maritime and air interceptions.

The Communist Party of Chinains military coercion against Taiwan on the one hand and participates in crisis communication on the other. Communication can reduce the likelihood of an unexpected outbreak of war, but can not replace the continued monitoring of the Chinese military expansion and the threat to Taiwan itself.