Taiwan issue warming up before Xi Jinping meeting: Japanese allies worry that the U.S. will turn arms sales and commitments into negotiation codes

US President Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping are expected to meet in Washington on September 24.Reuters on September 17.Taiwan, Japan and some U.S. allies are closely monitoring the Taiwan issue, fearing that Trump may use arms sales, political statements or security commitments toward Taiwan in economic and trade talks as a code for economic concessions with Beijing.

“Allies are not worried about a word, but about policy changes.”

Reuters quoted several regional officials and analysts as saying:In the past, Trump has described U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as a “negotiation code” while remaining vague about whether the U.S. will co-defense Taiwan in the Taiwan Sea conflict.This statement has raised concerns in Taipei and Tokyo that even if Washington has not officially changed the “one-China policy”, changes in individual phrases or arms sales decisions may also be interpreted by Beijing as a decline in U.S. support.

Taiwan has expressed its concerns to the U.S. through diplomatic and security channels; Japanese officials have also sought to confirm that the U.S. will not exchange the economic and trade agreement for Taiwan’s core security interests. In the reality of the highly militarized Taiwan Sea, the language of diplomacy itself may influence the risk judgment of all parties.

The most sensitive part of Taiwan’s policy is not whether or not a new strategy is suddenly announced, but whether or not arms sales, joint statements, talks and crisis promises have been a continuous minor regression or escalation.

Beijing sees Taiwan as “the core of its core interests”

The Chinese government has long argued that Taiwan belongs to China and has not given up the option of using force to unification.During Xi Jinping's tenure, the frequency of Chinese military aircraft, warships and joint warfare surveillance patrols around Taiwan has continued to increase, and Beijing has repeatedly asked the United States to stop arms sales and official exchanges with Taiwan.

Meanwhile, the United States continues to supply defensive weapons to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act andins the so-called “strategic ambiguity.”Reported by ReutersA $14 billion arms sale plan to Taiwan is still to be approved by Trump, and the way it is handled has thus become an important indicator for the outside world to observe the summit.

Why is Japan so tense?

Taiwan is very close to the southwestern islands of Japan, and once a military conflict breaks out in the Taiwan Sea, it will directly involve Japan's shipping, energy transportation, U.S. military bases and regional defense arrangements.

For Japan, if the U.S. weakens the Taiwan issue in negotiations with Beijing, it will affect not only Taiwan, but also the credibility of U.S. security commitments in Asia. The most concerned allies are that major security arrangements are temporarily negotiated, rather than through open, sustained and predictable strategic adjustments.

Beyond the Red Wall: Beijing most hopes to see is to turn Taiwan into a China-US bilateral trading target

From Beijing's policy logic, the more the Taiwan issue is compressed into a negotiating matter between the leaders of the two countries, the more likely Taiwan's own political subjectivity is to be marginalized.Beijing has long opposed Taiwan's participation in international organizations and high-level diplomatic activities, while demanding that Washington restrict arms sales, official contacts and political expression.

But Taiwan is a political community with its own government, electoral system, military and more than 23 million inhabitants. Any arrangement involving peace and security in the Taiwan Sea can increase the risk of misjudgment and instability if it is dealt with only within the framework of big-power transactions by circumventing Taiwan society itself. This is why Japan, Europe and other regional partners are increasingly stressing that the situation in the Taiwan Sea cannot be changed by coercion or unilaterally.

It can be confirmed that Taipei and Tokyo are fighting for policy guarantees in advance, while Beijing hopes to use the summit to push the U.S. to restrict support for Taiwan. What really needs to be observed is not whether a dramatic declaration appears after the meeting, but whether weapons sales approval, joint declaration wording, official exchanges and crisis communication mechanisms have changed substantially.