Xi Jinping pushes “war preparation” to the ends of society: Taiwan’s ten-day Hanshan exercise ends, Beijing’s military pressure has given birth to the national defense system

At the end of this year's ten-day Hankook exercise in Taiwan on August 14, the exercises tested not only tanks, missiles and troops. In recent days, mobile networks in cities such as Taipei have been actively slowing down, hospitals, transportation systems and local governments have been included in wartime resilience tests, and ordinary residents have experienced communication blockage for the first time directly. Taiwan has interpreted this arrangement as a preview of wartime communication infrastructure being attacked or underwater cable disruption.

The Chinese Ministry of Defence called the Han Gong exercise a “traffic of labor and wealth injury” that caused war panic, while stressing that the Liberation Army will continue to remain prepared against “Taiwan independence” and external interference.

If only the two sides are arranged in parallel, it is still only a political confrontation that appears in Taiwan every year. The real change this year is that Taiwan is turning the past mainly military war preparations into social governance issues. The Associated Press that during the exercise, some areas of the mobile Internet was reduced to 256 Kbps, almost only text communication; this year's exercise also involves the closure of metro stations, the transfer of hospitals to underground space.

Taiwan has long faced the activities of the Liberation Army aircraft and warships in the vicinity, and the Chinese government has never given up the option to unification by force.In recent years, Chinese aircraft and naval vessels have continued to be active around Taiwan, while the United States has openly called for Beijing to stop military pressure on Taiwan.

From the political trajectory since Xi Jinping came to power, Beijing has tried to increase the fear of resistance costs in Taiwanese society through military advantage, sea and air activities, blockade exercises and political deterrence.But more than a decade later, an increasingly apparent counter-effect is forming: Taiwan has not lifted defenses due to military pressure, but has instead begun to learn how to maintain a country operating in the event of network breaks, airstrikes, blockades and infrastructure damage.

It is also a political account that is most worth re-calculating in Beijing after the Hanshan exercise on August

1. Military deterrence, of course, can create risks, but not necessarily obedience; when a society begins to practice ahead of time to continue to live under conditions of attack, deterrence itself is changing the deterrent.

The Xi Jinping administration has long claimed that military operations are aimed at “Taiwan separatists,” but missiles, warships and blockade threats are not just Taiwanese politicians who end up facing. The networks, hospitals, power supply, transportation and the daily lives of 23 million people could all be part of the consequences of the war.

A regime that hopes to force Taiwan to accept political arrangements through deterrence is now faced with the reality that the more concrete the pressure it imposes, the more concrete the preparation of Taiwanese society to learn how to resist this pressure.