From fundraising to internship, how the Chinese Communist Party has reached the American political talent pipeline.

The White House released a declassified FBI file on August 17 that once again put the case of Christine Fang at the centre of the US counterintelligence issue. Unlike previous reports surrounding “spy for beautiful women” or private relationships, the paper more fully displays the multiple paths of Fang’s activity in American politics: she not only came into contact with rising political figures through societies and local political activities, but also participated in campaign fundraising, helped recommend interns to Congressional offices, and developed private and even sexual relationships with some officials. The White House classified the material into the code-named “Rusty Thumbs” project, and called the FBI’s evidence in the year involving issues such as sexual relationships, foreign trainees and suspected illegal political contributions.

The case really deserves a re-examination, not a pearly event in U.S. politics more than a decade ago, but a complete chain that could form between these means. U.S. intelligence officials previously believed that Fang was linked to the Chinese Ministry of National Security system and viewed its activities as a long-term political intelligence operation targeting U.S. local and federal politicians.Axios revealed in 2020 after a year of investigation that U.S. intelligence officials believed Fang’s activities were dominated by China’s main civil intelligence agency’s National Security Department, one of its goals being to contact local officials who had not yet entered the core of U.S. power but could in the future become congressmen, governors or other senior political figures.

Starting with local politics, the CCP intelligence system targets “future power figures”

Feng’s entry into American politics did not start in Washington, D.C. In 2011, she joined California State University’s East Bay and served in Chinese student organizations and Asian-Pacific public affairs organizations. Since then, she has frequently participated in political events in the Bay Area, Chinese community activities and fundraising meetings, and has gradually established contacts with local mayors, city councillors, candidates and other political figures. Axios cites several U.S. intelligence officials saying that Feng’s attention is focused on those with political rising potential, and this choice is highly aligned with the strategy of China’s intelligence system to foster long-term political relationships.

Eric Swalwell is in this phase of entering the network of relationships between the two. When the two first contacted, Swalwell was only a member of the City of Dublin, California, and has not yet entered the U.S. Congress. In 2012, he was successfully elected to the Federal Congress, and then gradually entered the U.S. national political scene. For a foreign intelligence agency, the value of such a person does not necessarily depend on how much secrets they had at the time, but on what positions they could enter in the future. Axios pointed out directly in the report that the Fang Case showed a long-term training strategy that could only be rewarded years or even decades later: today's mayors and city councillors, future governors and congressmen.

This is also the key to the concept of “political talent pipeline” in the Feng Shui case. If the Chinese intelligence agency waits until a person has become a senior official and tries to approach, not only is the risk higher, but the other party has often entered the scope of strict security censorship and counterintelligence surveillance. In contrast, from campus organizations, local governments, minority communities and local campaigns, it can establish interpersonal relationships when the target has not been highly prevented, and the value of such relationships is constantly expanded as the target political status rises.

Sex is one of the means of approximation.

In the past few years, the most popular part of the case has been whether she has used sex to get close to U.S. officials. The FBI documents have been decrypted, making some of which have not been publicly confirmed clearer.

According to the San Francisco Journal, according to a newly released FBI interview summary, Swalwell told federal investigators that he had had several physical relationships with Ferguson between 2012 and

1. Swalwell said the two had no formal date or relationship, and he thought the relationship was arbitrary, but felt Ferguson wanted to establish a more intimate romantic relationship with him.

Swalwell is not the only American politician previously to have been accused of having a sexual or romantic relationship with Phnom Penh. Axios cited a U.S. intelligence official and a former elected official in an investigation in early 2020 as saying that Phnom Penh had developed a sexual or romantic relationship with at least two mayors in U.S. central-western cities. The names of the two mayors have not been disclosed, so it is currently impossible to further verify their identity and what role these relations have played in intelligence activities.

This means that sex is indeed a way for Swalwell to establish political contacts, but it can’t simply be inferred that all American politicians with whom she has been in contact have been “coloured”. Currently, public evidence supports Swalwell’s acknowledgement of physical relationships with her, and at least two other unnamed Midwest mayors have been referred to as having sex or romantic relationships with her by U.S. intelligence and insiders. As for other politicians with whom Swalwell has been in contact, more evidence is now focused on social, political activities, fundraising and organizational relationships.

This distinction is important for anti-intelligence investigations. The so-called “honey trap” doesn’t necessarily involve stealing a confidential document as an immediate target. Private relationships can help intelligence personnel understand the character, weaknesses, schedules, interpersonal networks and political needs of the target, and further build trust. The true value of intelligence may come from long-term proximity rather than one-off exchange.

Switch from “better relationship” to fundraising network

If the report only focuses on which officials Fang has been in contact with, it will miss out on a more systematic layer of the case: political fundraising.

Axios previously that she had helped raise funds for Swalwell's 2014 re-election campaign and played a similar "bundler" role in the local political sphere, bringing multiple donors to the candidate's fundraising system. U.S. Federal Election Law prohibits foreign citizens from contributing directly or indirectly to the federal campaign, so the FBI also investigated the issue of whether some of the funds involved existed through a third-party cover-up of the real source of contributions.

When the White House released the "Rusty Thumbs" document, it directly listed "suspicious illegal donations" as one of the focal points of the FBI's acquisition and investigation.But it should be clear that the FBI's investigation did not ultimately lead to Swalwell's criminal prosecution for related acts, so the clues the investigators possessed cannot directly equate to the fact that the court found the violation.

From the point of view of intelligence operations, the meaning of political fundraising is not just money. A person who can help candidates organize activities, connect donors and expand a network of support for ethnic minorities can easily gain access to the private social circles of campaign teams and politicians. For young politicians in the upward stage, this help can even form long-term relationships and trust in the early stages of their careers.

What the CPC intelligence system can really pursue is not necessarily to “buy” a certain US member of parliament for thousands of dollars, but to use this legitimate political activity to gain legitimate identity of repeatedly approaching the goal.

* Internship is more valuable than sex.

If private relationships can build trust and fundraising can get into campaign networks, then internship recommendations mean another more specific political entry.

New FBI publications and previous Axios investigations have shown that Phnom Penh has been involved in finding and recommending interns for Swalwell’s political team, with at least one person later entering his congressional office.

This detail may have more long-term national security significance than sexual relations in the case. Congressional interns usually do not have direct contact with the highest level of state secrets, but they access the human pipeline within the U.S. political system. Congressional schedules, office structure, policy priorities, voter contacts, staff relations and a variety of political information that is not classified as classified may have intelligence value.

More importantly, interns won’t stay in internships forever. A large number of senior congressional officers, policy advisors, campaign staff and government officials have started building a career network from their younger internship experience. A 22-year-old congressional internship student could become a senior commission assistant, campaign manager, and even enter the executive department a decade later.

Therefore, if a person commanded or influenced by a foreign intelligence agency is able to participate in deciding who enters the U.S. political office, then what is really being established is not just a one-person relationship, but maybe a chain of people.

It’s also one of the questions that Fang’s case most needs to be investigated: how many people she recommended to political offices, where they went afterwards, whether they remained in Congress, local governments, or campaign systems, or whether similar staff arrangements have taken place in the offices of other politicians?

China's goal may not be "secret today", but "relationships in ten years"

The most likely change to traditional spying perceptions is the judgment of U.S. anti-intelligence officials about their operating patterns. The public often thinks that the value of foreign espionage depends on the ability to enter military bases, steal technical information or obtain classified documents.

For the Chinese intelligence system, an open meeting of a local city council member, a mayoral meeting, a Chinese community fundraising event, and an internship in a young political office could all be the gateway to building long-term relationships.Fang has participated in U.S. mayoral meetings and actively established contacts with local politicians in different regions; Axios reports that this activity shows that its objectives are not limited to a particular politician, but a group of potential rising figures in U.S. local politics.

The advantage of this model lies in time.The proximity is not noticeable when the target is only local officials; when the target starts campaigning for Congress, it can be assisted with fundraising; when the target enters Congress, it can be recommended for people; if the target eventually enters important committees or administrative departments, the relationship that has been established early may be of higher value.

Therefore, the so-called “how the CCP has reached the pipeline of American political talents” does not mean that the FBI has proven that the CCP controls these politicians, but rather that the public archives and the judgments of U.S. intelligence officials present a highly vigilant path: starting with young politicians who are not yet at the core of power, and building a long-term network through communities, fundraising, private relationships and personal recommendations.

Swalwell has not been found to have leaked confidentiality to Ferguson

In this case, there is also a fact boundary that must be clear.

At present, public information does not show that Swalwell has provided U.S. government secrets to Swalwell, nor is there evidence that he has accepted the command of the Chinese intelligence agency. The FBI counter-intelligence defence briefing to Swalwell in about 2015 to remind him of his concerns about the identity and activities of Swalwell.

The federal investigation into the relationship between Swalwell and Phnom Penh did not eventually raise any criminal charges against him. The Ethics Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives launched an investigation in 2021 and ended the investigation in 2023, without disciplinary action.

Swalwell’s lawyers have also asked the FBI to stop publishing the investigation documents this year, arguing that the publication of old investigation materials without criminal prosecution is political blackmail and may violate federal law and the long-standing policy of the Department of Justice.

These facts do not weaken the anti-intelligence significance of Feng Feng’s case, but rather show that reports must distinguish between two different questions: whether an American politician is illegal, and whether it succeeds in approaching and entering the relationship system of Chinese intelligence networks with American politicians.

*Fun is just one person, and this pattern really needs to be tracked *

More than a decade later, the FBI files were re-opened, and the most worrying thing about Ferguson was not how many U.S. officials she had sex with. Sex was just a means of getting closer to the entire network, together with fundraising, community activities, political socialism and internship recommendations.

The real danger of this pathway is that it almost all occurs within the normal space of the American open political system. A student can organize a community, a community person can attend a mayoral meeting, a political supporter can help raise funds, and a acquaintance can recommend interns to the parliamentary office. Alone, each behavior can be completely normal; only when these behaviors are connected with the long-term political intelligence tasks of foreign intelligence agencies, their national security significance changes.

The White House’s “Rusty Thumbs” archive left a question more important than Swalwell’s private life: Has the CCP’s national security and political influence system used the same method to approach local U.S. officials, young candidates and future political personnel in advance?

If this long-term training model exists, then the intelligence agency needs to look for not necessarily someone who has already sat in the National Security Conference Room.

Only in ten years will they become real powers.