Luxury Tombs, Family Tombs, and Leaders' Mausoleums: Who Truly Lives Outside of Funeral Reform?

Luxury Tombs, Family Tombs, and Leaders' Mausoleums: Who Truly Lives Outside of Funeral Reform? In Shaanxi's Yulin, luxury tombs, family tombs, and illegal cemeteries are scattered across the mountains and fields, with funeral profiteering and regulatory failures coexisting; the large mausoleum of Xi Zhongxun reveals the privileged order of the CCP's powerful families, which exists outside of reforms. As the CCP continuously demands that ordinary people "change customs" and promote land-saving and ecological burials, Shaanxi's Yulin has been exposed for having large areas of illegal cemeteries, family tombs, and luxury tombs. On-site photos show that some cemeteries are directly built on forest land and barren slopes, with large areas of tombs and enclosed walls distributed among the mountains; some tomb areas lack complete office facilities, only having simple enclosed walls, sales phones, and boundary markers, yet they are still openly operating. More ironically, in the same Shaanxi, ordinary people bear high costs for a grave, and many local cemeteries are rectified for illegal land occupation, while the CCP's highest power families possess large mausoleums named, maintained, and promoted by officials. The Xi Zhongxun Mausoleum in Shaanxi's Fuping has long been listed as a so-called "patriotic education base," with a statue of Xi Zhongxun standing in front, and political slogans such as "retire without resigning, flatten tombs and plant grain, leading cadres, and set an example" hanging on site. However, this slogan, which requires cadres to "flatten tombs and plant grain, and set an example," forms a nearly absurd contrast with the mausoleum itself. Who is required to flatten tombs? Who is required to save land? Who truly possesses large mausoleums, statues, squares, and official memorial systems? Yulin's Mountains Are Cut into Cemeteries, and Illegal Businesses Are Conducted Openly From the on-site photos revealed this time, many mountains in Yulin have been cut into large areas of cemeteries.

One photo shows that the cemetery entrance has a large billboard, indicating the name of the "Wanfu Mountain Cemetery" and the company name and contact phone number, with the cemetery's internal roads extending directly into the depths of the mountains. Another photo shows that the cement wall is sprayed with "tomb" and contact phone number, with extremely simple operating methods, yet directly facing society to sell tombs. More photos show that large areas of slopes are densely distributed with white boundary markers. The boundary markers divide the forest land and barren slopes into different areas, obviously serving to define the scope of tomb use. From a distance, the cemeteries are not isolated, but rather extend along the entire mountain slope, with some areas already forming large-scale tomb groups. In some areas, enclosed family tombs are separated by walls, with each tomb area occupying dozens of square meters or even larger areas, and the walls are connected along the mountain contours. These tombs are no longer ordinary single tombs, but rather private family-owned small cemeteries.

Another on-site photo shows a luxurious tomb built with a gate, stone railings, stone tablets, and large incense burners, surrounded by cypress trees, with a wide stone road in front of the tomb. Its construction specifications and occupied area are obviously different from ordinary tombs. Another photo shows that multiple people are constructing or holding burial activities in the mountain tomb area, indicating that some cemeteries are not only historical remnants but are still in use or even being expanded. These images collectively present a fact: Yulin's funeral chaos is not just one or two isolated tombs, but has already formed a large-scale cemetery industry based on forest land, arable land, and mountainous areas. From Renting Land to Selling Tombs, Land Is Turned into a Highly Profitable Commodity According to previous investigative revelations, some cemetery operators in Yulin rent hundreds of acres of forest land and arable land from village committees or village collectives at low prices, and then divide the land to sell to tomb buyers at a price of hundreds of yuan per square meter. Operators do not even need to build regular service halls or complete funeral facilities. They only need to enclose the land, set up signs, spray contact phone numbers, and use boundary markers to define the area, and then they can start selling tomb land. Under this business model, rural land that was originally priced very low can see its price increase by hundreds or even thousands of times once it is sold as a tomb. Funeral services are no longer a public service, but have become a business that relies on land price differences to reap huge profits. The new "Funeral Management Regulations" that came into effect on March 30, 2026, emphasize the public welfare nature of the funeral industry, requiring strengthened fee management and full-chain regulation, promoting land-saving or minimal land occupation burial methods, and encouraging ecological and land-saving burials. However, the reality presented in Yulin is different: mountains are constantly being cut into by walls and boundary markers, large family tombs continue to exist, and cemeteries that have not undergone thorough public approval still leave behind sales phone numbers, and tomb land is still circulating in the market as a commodity. This shows that the problem has never been just about some people retaining traditional burial habits. What truly drives the chaos is the interest chain formed by land profiteering, local power, and ineffective regulation. Why Can Illegal Cemeteries Exist for a Long Time? Hundreds of acres, or even thousands of acres, of mountainous land cannot be turned into cemeteries in just one day. From renting land, building roads, building walls, and dividing tomb areas, to public advertising, fee collection, and continuous tomb construction, every link is within the sight of local governments and grassroots organizations. The civil affairs department is responsible for funeral regulation, the natural resources department is responsible for land use, the forestry department is responsible for forest land protection, the market regulation department is responsible for business activities, and the township government and village committee directly control local land use. Such large-scale cemeteries cannot exist for a long time without being noticed. What truly needs to be answered is: who signed the land rental agreement? Who allowed the construction of roads and walls? Who knew about the cemetery's public sales? Which departments conducted inspections? Why can construction continue after punishment? Is the illegal income recovered? Are regulatory personnel held accountable? China's Central Radio and Television Corporation previously discovered during investigations of illegal cemeteries in other regions that even if such cemeteries are deemed illegal, actual demolition and land restoration still face local resistance. Yulin's situation further illustrates that in a system lacking public supervision and independent accountability, so-called special rectification campaigns often only deal with a few operators, without touching the power relationships behind the illegal industry. If a cemetery can operate for many years without legal procedures, it relies not only on market demand but also possibly on local power's tacit approval, protection, or participation. Why Is Xi Zhongxun's Mausoleum an Exception to the Rules? In the same Shaanxi, Xi Zhongxun's mausoleum is an exception to the rules. Photos of the mausoleum show a wide square, steps, statues, greenery, flower wreaths, and official political slogans. Xi Zhongxun was the father of Xi Jinping, a former member of the CCP Politburo, Vice Premier of the State Council, and Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. His political status comes from the CCP's internal power system, not from the authorization of the Chinese people through free and competitive elections. According to the CCP's party charter, the CCP Central Committee General Secretary is elected by the Central Committee's plenary session, not directly by Chinese citizens through voting. The President of China is elected by the National People's Congress, not directly by all citizens through voting. Therefore, the CCP's so-called "party and state leaders" are not democratically elected leaders authorized by the people but are rulers produced within the closed power system. The public has never had the opportunity to decide through open elections whether Xi Zhongxun should hold high national positions or whether they agree to use land and public resources to build a large mausoleum for him.

There are significant differences in publicly available information regarding the specific scale of Xi Zhongxun's mausoleum. Some sources claim the mausoleum and related areas are approximately 100,000 square meters, while other reports indicate that the memorial park surrounding it underwent expansion before and after Xi Jinping came to power, with the scale being at least hundreds of mu. Due to the lack of complete public disclosure of land approval, engineering budgets, funding sources, and long-term maintenance costs, it is difficult for the outside world to independently verify the actual scope and public investment. This lack of transparency is at the core of the problem. Ordinary cemeteries need to be regulated by civil affairs, land, forestry, and market supervision departments; ordinary families need to comply with area restrictions, pay tomb fees and management fees; but the mausoleum of the highest leader's father is approved by whom? How is the land acquired? Who approves the expansion? Who bears the costs? Is it subject to independent auditing? In a one-party authoritarian system, there is no independent media that can freely investigate the highest power families, no independent parliament that can demand public budgets, and no independent judiciary that can review potential conflicts of interest. This makes Xi Zhongxun's mausoleum a de facto zone exempt from ordinary social supervision. "Flatten Tombs and Plant Grain, and Set an Example" Becomes the Greatest Political Irony The most striking aspect of Xi Zhongxun's mausoleum is not just the tall statue and wide steps but the red slogan hanging above: "Retire without resigning, flatten tombs and plant grain, leading cadres, and set an example." This slogan originally aimed to create a political image of Xi Zhongxun as frugal and obedient to policies, but when it is hung above a large leader's mausoleum that far exceeds ordinary tombs in scale, it forms a strong irony. Ordinary peasants' tombs can be flattened due to rectification, ordinary families are required to give up traditional burials, and ordinary tomb spaces are restricted to minimal areas; while the CCP leaders who require others to "flatten tombs and plant grain" possess statues, squares, and mausoleums maintained by officials after their death. This is no longer just a matter of saying one thing and doing another; it is the most direct display of the CCP's power hierarchy. For ordinary people, "land-saving burials" are administrative requirements that must be enforced; for the powerful, "mausoleums" are redefined as red education bases, party history education bases, and public memorial facilities. As long as they are given a political name, large tombs are no longer called large tombs, and land occupation is no longer seen as a waste of land. The arrangements for the powerful families after death are even packaged as political education that all people must accept. This is the systemic logic of the CCP: on the same land, ordinary people's occupation is "feudal superstition," while the powerful's occupation is "patriotic education"; ordinary people's family tombs are targets for rectification, while the powerful families' mausoleums become government-organized tourist attractions for flower offerings and worship. The CCP Has Not Eliminated Feudal Privileges but Has Rebuilt a Political Aristocracy The CCP has long claimed to have overthrown the feudal system and eliminated the privileged class, but in reality, it has only replaced the royal family's bloodline with the party's internal hierarchy, rebuilding a system of political aristocracy. Ancient emperors inherited power through bloodlines and built mausoleums after death; CCP powerful families inherit power through the party's organizational system and build mausoleums, former residences, and memorial halls after death, which are maintained by local governments. Ancient mausoleums were symbols of imperial power; today's leaders' mausoleums are packaged as "red tourism" and "patriotic education." More alarming is that Xi Zhongxun's mausoleum is not a historical relic unrelated to current power. His son Xi Jinping currently holds the highest power in the CCP, and the father's mausoleum was expanded and politically promoted during Xi's rise to power. Even without public evidence that Xi Jinping directly ordered it, local officials' proactive expansion to curry favor with the top leader also reveals the political sycophancy and power dependence within the authoritarian system. In democratic systems, memorial projects involving the immediate family of the current national leader should be subject to parliamentary, media, audit, and public supervision; in the CCP system, such projects are shrouded in a political forbidden zone. Anyone who raises questions may be accused of attacking "revolutionary predecessors" or challenging political authority. Ordinary People: Spending Everything on Housing While Alive, and Going Bankrupt Again for Tombs After Death Compared to the CCP powerful families' political mausoleums, the reality of ordinary Chinese people is even more dismal. Many families exhaust their savings, including those of two generations, to buy a house and bear the burden of twenty or thirty years of mortgages. While alive, most of their income goes to real estate, banks, and land finance; after death, their families must pay for body transportation, cold storage, farewell ceremonies, cremation, urns, tomb spaces, and management fees within a very short time. The grief of losing a loved one leaves families with almost no bargaining power. Funeral service providers can take advantage of the lack of transparency, time urgency, and traditional views to layer upon layer increase the prices of services that should have public welfare characteristics. The newly revised "Funeral Management Regulations" specifically require the implementation of service itemization, prohibit extra-list pricing, and require relevant departments to curb excessive charging, which itself indicates that funeral profiteering and high costs have become social problems that cannot be ignored. Ordinary people can only afford a few dozen square meters of living space when buying houses; after death, even one square meter of tomb space may be difficult to afford. Meanwhile, CCP powerful families, who have never been elected by the people through free elections, can occupy large areas of land after death, with their mausoleums maintained and promoted by officials, and require ordinary people to visit for ideological education. This is not just a simple wealth gap but a hierarchy of life and death created by power. Who Is the Funeral Reform Really Reforming? Yulin's illegal cemeteries, family tombs, and luxury tombs certainly need to be investigated according to law, and the illegally occupied land should be dealt with. However, if the rectification only targets civilian operators and ordinary people, without touching the CCP powerful families' mausoleums, then the so-called funeral reform is just selective governance. For ordinary people, reform means limiting tomb sizes, changing traditional customs, and bearing high costs; for local interest groups, cemeteries mean land enclosure, tomb sales, and profiteering; for CCP powerful families, mausoleums mean political memorials, family glory, and official worship. It turns out that what truly lives outside of funeral reforms is not just the illegal cemetery operators in Yulin but the CCP power hierarchy that exists above the law and public supervision. On Yulin's mountains, a cement wall bears the phone number for tomb sales, with boundary markers filled with wild grass; in Fuping's mausoleum, Xi Zhongxun sits atop his statue, with steps, flower wreaths, and political slogans together forming a venue for power memorials. The two types of tombs seem different but are produced by the same system: one turns land into a highly profitable commodity, and the other turns power into posthumous privileges. Before the CCP demands that Chinese citizens save the last square meter of land, it must first answer: Why can Xi Zhongxun and other party-state powerful families, who have never been elected by the people through free elections, possess large mausoleums maintained by officials? How much land do these mausoleums occupy? How much public funding is invested? Who approves them? Who supervises them? Why can ordinary people's tombs be flattened, while the powerful families' mausoleums can become patriotic education bases? Why can the so-called funeral reform only reform powerless citizens, never touching the political families that hold power? This is the most unavoidable systemic truth behind the chaos of luxury tombs and family tombs in Yulin.