Beijing believes that issues involving national security, ethnic division and reunification can be investigated across the borders of the People's Republic of China.
Taipei is establishing an entirely opposite system: as long as Chinese state forces threaten to carry out threats across Taiwan’s legal boundaries, they may be the subject of Taiwan’s criminal justice process.
On August 11, Taiwan revealed that a cross-departmental multinational repression work platform at the executive level had called for legal countermeasures.The amendments first targeted the Criminal Law, while police have begun to establish a list of people who could be subjected to transnational repression by the CCP and actively contact high-risk individuals.
Taiwan human rights activist Li Mingxi became the actual object of this system.
Li confirmed to Taiwanese media that the police had established direct contact with him and told him to report immediately in case of an unusual situation so that law enforcement could intervene quickly.
The Taiwan government’s position is that the transnational repression of the Chinese Communist Party against Taiwanese people is often hidden, and that relying solely on the reporting mechanism after the occurrence of traditional criminal cases is not sufficient to protect potential targets, so it is necessary to establish early warning and contact networks before the incident occurs.
Beijing’s legal logic is expanding in the opposite direction.
The Law on the Promotion of National Unity and Progress, implemented on July 1, this year, clearly contains clauses on legal liability against foreign organizations and individuals.China's foreign and national affairs officials have previously publicly defended the application of such measures outside the territory, believing that the measures in question are in line with international practice and are necessary to safeguard national unity.
Taiwan's Foreign Ministry has publicly accused the system of "long-arm jurisdiction" and transnational repression, and called for a joint response by the international community.
The two positions resulted in a direct collision.
Beijing argues that China’s domestic law can prosecute those who are found abroad to undermine national unity and support division.
Taipei argues that if the Chinese government carries out such political responsibility in Taiwan or against Taiwanese citizens, it could itself constitute a transnational crackdown that requires criminal countermeasures.
The key to this conflict is no longer in the two-street political slogans, but in the most basic borders of national sovereignty.
In recent years, China’s surveillance, threats, and pressure on domestic families against overseas dissidents, Uighurs, Tibetans, Hong Kong activists and democracy movements have prompted more and more democracies to shift transnational repression from diplomatic disputes to criminal law enforcement.
Taiwan has taken another step forward.
It no longer waits for the victim to search for the police after being threatened.
The police are actively looking for people who may be the target.
This meant that for the first time the transnational repression of the CCP faced a mirror-like systemic reaction: Beijing set up a target list, democratic societies set up a protection list; Beijing tried to extend cross-border control, and the targeted government was prepared to use its own criminal law to block that control.
The international principles that ultimately need to be established are not complicated.
After one leaves the territory controlled by an authoritarian regime, one should not still live in fear of that regime.


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