From a photo to “inciting a crime of separation”: Zhang Expose How Xi Jinping Ruled “National Security” Eat Expression Borders

A notice of arrest issued by the Lassa Municipal Public Security Bureau has brought the case into a phase where it is no longer possible to interpret it with “ordinary public security cases.” The document shows that on July 28, 2026, the Lassa Municipal Public Security Bureau executed the arrest of Zhang Yi on suspicion of “inciting a crime of secession of the state” and is currently detained in the Lassa Municipal Detention Centre.

What this case really needs to look at is not the outcome of Zhang Ying’s “attraction,” but how the state agencies have steadily escalated a publicly known simple act – showing a photograph of the Dalai Lama to a Tibetan in the Lhasa Temple – into a national security crime under Chinese criminal law.

Zhang Ying's son Zhang Long recently received an interview with Radio Free Asia, which revealed the timeline from his father's being taken to official arrest. The family was initially informed only by the Tibetan National Security that Zhang Ying would be imprisoned for "15 days"; on July 18, the National Security notified the family's case had been turned into criminal detention; the family then received a notification, only to learn that Zhang Ying was suspected of "incitement to the separation of the state"; on July 30, the family received a phone call again, and was informed that Zhang Ying had been officially arrested.

The testimony of the family in the video further focuses the most central doubts of the case: what new criminal facts have been added between the initial vague “15 days” and the later official “crime of incitement to secession of the country”?

If the answer is new evidence, then the evidence should go into the defence of lawyers, prosecutors, and court proceedings to be tested; if there is no new substantive act, just because the political identity of Zhang Yi, the sensitive symbol of the Dalai Lama, and the particular political security environment of Tibet have caused the case to escalate, it will be difficult to continue to be understood as ordinary criminal justice, and closer to a political qualitative-dominated criminal prosecution.

Article 103 of the Criminal Law of China punishes acts of "incitement to the division of the country, undermining the unity of the country".The public explanation of the National Congress of "incitement" is also clear that the so-called incitement is to encourage and promote others through language, text, images and other means, with the intention of making others accept the relevant claims or carry out related acts. Images can become the carrier of incitement, but the appearance of an image, itself obviously cannot complete the entire criminal composition of "incitement to the division of the country".

So what Zhang really needed to prove was not whether there were photographs of the Dalai Lama in his phone, but what he actually spread of the separation state claims, to whom the impulses were implemented, how he tried to incite others to participate in the separation activities, and how these acts reached the extent of criminal crime.

If these facts could not eventually be removed from “a photograph of the Dalai Lama,” then the case would not be a common crime controversy, but a much more serious political criminalization of nature: first defining individuals and symbols as taboo, then interpreting the expression of touching the taboo as a security risk, and finally fixing such political judgments as criminal responsibility with a national security crime.

This is the most dangerous place where Xi Jinping has ruled the country’s national security system since its continuous expansion.

Over the past decade, Beijing has consistently emphasized the "general national security view", and put political security, regime security, institutional security and ideological security in the central position of the national security system.The official documents of the Tibetan Autonomous Region make it more clear that "political security as the rule", put "regime security, institutional security, ideological security" at the core of national security work, while deepening the anti-separture struggle, and to integrate religion, ideology and grass-roots governance into the overall security system.

The essence of this governing logic is the continuous overlap of concepts that should be distinguished: regime security can be interpreted as national security, ideological security can be interpreted as political security, religious and ethnic issues can be incorporated into the anti-section system.

The event took place in the context of this system.

July 1, 2026 is also the first day of the official implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Promotion of National Unity and Progress. This law was passed by the National People's Congress on March 12, and signed by President Xi Jinping's Decree No. 71, announced for implementation from July

1. Article 62 of the law clearly stipulates that the organization, planning, implementation of ethnic division activities and "incitement" related acts constitute criminal responsibility for crimes.

This does not prove that the case of Zhang Yi was handled according to the law, nor does it prove that the relevant organs intended to take him as a demonstration case after the implementation of the new law.

Zhang Long said in an interview that he was very concerned that his father was "taken to the flag" by the relevant authorities.

This sentence can now only be used as a family judgment, and not directly as a fact conclusion.But the problem is that the Xi Jinping authorities themselves have clearly demanded that national work be combined with their political ideas and national security systems.The National People's Congress officials require the interpretation of the new law to combine the implementation of the law with Xi Jinping's idea about national work; the Tibetan officials clearly demand that the overall national security view be firmly established and that anti-separation and religious governance continue to be promoted.

Therefore, the criticism of Zhang Yi’s case is not just the “excess law enforcement” of some public security organs, but a deeper institutional question: Is the criminal law losing the boundaries of the behavior that it should be after the party country’s political security demands continue to penetrate the ethnic, religious and judicial governance?

The most dangerous place in the Xi Jinping regime is not to publicly declare “no rule of law”, but to constantly package political control into legal governance.

This way of governance is more hidden than simple impossibility. It retains legal names, case procedures, detention notices and arrest notices, while changing the judgment criteria behind these procedures through an extremely broad concept of national security. On the surface it is "lawfully handling cases", which actually determines the direction of cases, and often is whether a certain behavior affects political security, ideological security and regime security.

When this logic enters Tibet, its consequences are severe.

Beijing, of course, has the right to fight against acts of genuine organization, planning or incitement to divide the country, but “preserving national unity” cannot automatically give the ruling party the monopoly of religious interpretation, historical memory and political expression power. The Dalai Lama can be a political opponent in the eyes of Beijing, but at the same time has the status of a religious leader in the eyes of a large number of Tibetan Buddhist believers. If a regime compresses respect for this person, display its photos and genuine implementation of separatist activities into the same national security framework, then the criminal law safeguards not only the country’s territory, but the ruling party’s monopoly on Tibetan narrative.

Zhang Yi is a Chinese citizen, which is noteworthy.

This means that the case cannot simply be reduced to ethnic repression against Tibetans. Zhang Yi touched a political ban area, and once touched, the Han identity also could not separate him from this security machine. The rules exposed are clear: under Xi Jinping's rule, the national security system was really reviewed, not only national identity, but whether to obey the only official permitted political narrative.

Zhang’s own political experience has further reinforced this concern.

He participated in the Wuhan Exhibition in 1989 and has since been a long-time participant in the Fourth Anniversary, Liu Xiaobo Memorial and Citizenship activities, and has often been concerned by the National Security. These stories, of course, cannot be evidence of the crime of the 2026 case. Modern criminal justice should judge a person this time “what he did” rather than judge “who this person was” based on his past political stance.

Once the national security system first establishes a long-term "key person" tag for a person, then a photo of his travel, speech, object of contact and even a mobile phone can be placed in the existing political risk framework reinterpreted.

This is no longer just a “photo issue.”

It reveals a mechanism of political justice production: first, the political system of the party country determines what is sensitive, what is hostile, what threatens the security of the regime; then, the public security and the national security transform this judgment into a case; and finally, through detention, criticism and detention, political judgment acquires a legal appearance.

Therefore, the Notice of Arrest of July 28 is of special significance.

It proves that the case has gone beyond the immediate disposal of the public service and public security organs and entered the formal arrest procedure. According to the Chinese criminal proceedings system, the arrest is not a measure that public security organs can unilaterally complete, but must be legally approved or decided. In other words, the chain of prosecution has extended from public security investigation to the review and arrest link.

The real serious question also arises: what criminal facts have the authorized arrest authorities examined?

If there is evidence that Zhang Yi has carried out incitement separatism acts independently of “show photos”, then the evidence should be subject to judicial examination. If not, then approval of arrest is not just a matter of expansion of the powers of public security agencies, but means that judicial procedures that should bear the responsibility of censorship may be providing legality cover for the quality of political security.

This is the most cautious aspect of “rule the country according to law” under Xi Jinping’s political system.

The laws do not disappear, the courts, the prosecutors, the public security organs do not disappear; on the contrary, they continue to exist. What really changes is that the Party’s political judgment of national security, ethnicity, religion and ideology is deeper and deeper within these institutions.

This is exactly the opposite of the fundamental direction of the modern rule of law.

The real rule of law requires that state power be first bound by law, while the continuously strengthened governance model of Xi Jinping is another logic: law becomes a tool for achieving political goals, national security becomes a reason for expanding the boundaries of power, and judicial procedures may become an institutionalized channel for political control.

In the interview, Zhang Long had a very penetrating question: "When there is no language exchange, just by showing a photo can incite the division of the country, is this country blurred?"

This phrase does not need to be repeatedly cited in the main text, the video has been presented in full.But it accurately hit the most absurd contradictions of the whole case.

One regime, on the one hand, continuously claims that the country is strong, social stability, and national unity; on the other hand, it may be necessary to use national security, public security, national security crimes, detention and formal arrest procedures to target a photograph in a citizen’s mobile phone.

The real question is no longer just whether there is a crime.

A regime that builds its own security on ideological control, religious control, and political taboos does not know how far it needs to extend criminal law to maintain the “security” it defines.

If, in the end, there is no evidence of a crime more substantial than that photo, the conclusion left by Zhang Yi will be unusually clear: the threat is not the Chinese territory itself, but the political narrative that the Xi Jinping regime does not allow to be challenged; the criminal prosecution is not a real act of separation, but a citizen has crossed the ideological boundaries of power.

This is where the case is most deserving to be exposed.

A truly powerful nation doesn’t have to prove how dangerous a photo is with a prison.

Only a political system that sees different ideas as a potential threat can continuously extend “national security” to citizens’ language, religion, memory, and even mobile phones.